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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

January 15, 1981

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

David Levi

No. 80-1045:

Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc., et al.,
v. Internat'l Longshoremen's Ass'n

Questions Presented

1.

Whether a dispute between management and labor,

arising out of the Union's refusal to load ships headed for
Russia,
"-._......

is

a

"case

involving

or

growing

out

of

any

dispute" within the terms of the Norr is-LaGuardia Act.

labor

2.
Act,

If

whether

arbitration

a

the

dispute

federal

under

the

is within

the Norris-LaGuardia

court may enjoin
principles

the

stated

strike pending

in Boys Markets and

Buffalo Forge.

I.

Facts and Decision Below

On January 4, 1980, the United States began a grain
embargo

against

Afghanistan.

the

Soviet

Union

following

the

Shortly thereafter, the International President

of the International Longshoremen's Association
Gleason,

invasion of

(!LA), Thomas

announced that he was instructing all !LA unions on

the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts to boycott all shipments to the
Soviet Union of any materials including grain.
adopted
cargo

a

resolution

bound

to

or

boycott

was

limited

embargo

that

its members

coming

therefore

from

the

Soviet

considerably

ordered

by

would

boycott was purely a political boycott;

not handle

~

The

!LA

Union.

broader

President

The !LA also

than

the
The

Carter.

more
Union

no action was sought

from the employers of union members.
Jacsonville
terminal

in

Bulk

Jacksonville,

Terminals(JBT)

has

Florida,

which

from

superphosphor ic acid onto ships bound
subsidiary
subsidiary
contract

of

~ooker

Chemical

of / Occidental
with

the

Co.

Petroleum

Soviet

Union

for

Russia.

which
Corp.
for

in

a

shipping
it

JBT is a
turn

Occidental
the

loads

is

a

has

a

supply

of

''
y

superphosphoric
bargaining

acid.

agreement

JBT

is

between

a

party
the

to

the

Jacksonville

collective
Maritime

Association and Local 1408 of the ILA. On January 15, 1980,
Local

1408

refused

to

load

a Norwegian vessel

scheduled

to

pick up a cargo of acid from JBT for deli very to the Soviet
Union.
The collective bargaining agreement between JBT and
the Local includes a no-strike clause:
"During the term of this agreement the
employer agrees that there shall be no lockout of
the members of the Union, and the Union agrees that
there shall ~ stike ot any kind or degree
whatsoever, walkout, suspens1on o wor , curta1lment
or~Tmlta tion of production, slowdown, or any other
interruption or stoppage, total or partial, of the
employer's operation for any cause whatsoever."

In addition, the agreement contains a grievance and
arbitration provision:
"Matters under dispute which cannot be
promptly settled between the Local and an individual
Employer shall, no later than 48 hours after such
discussions, be referred in writing covering the
entire grievance in a Port Grievance Committee .•• A
majoirty decision of this Committee shall be final
and binding on both parties ...

Finally,

the

relevant to its scope.
covers

"all matters

agreement

contains

two

provisions

First, it provides that the Agreement

affecting wages,

hours,

and other

terms

and conditions of employment and that during the term of this
Agreement the Employers will not be required to negotiate on
any

further

matters

specifically set
agreement

affecting

forth

in

---

expressly

these

or

other

this Agreement."

-

----

to

not

And second,

the

------

control
over
the
-~
....
,________________________
~
________________________
, ______
management, _____
of its business and the direction of its work

__________

reserves

subjects

JBT

force:
"The Management of the Employer's business and the
'
.....--'
direction of the work force in the operation of the business
are

exclusviely

vested

in

the

Employer

as

functions

of

Management."

Faced
Norwegian

with

vessel,

JBT

pending arbitration,
a Qd

Er~nary

the

it

Union's

sought

to

refusal

to

load

the

compe }2)arbitration

~ough ;-~emporary

and,

restrainin

injunc!ion to halt the boycott.

The district

court complied, enjoining the union from refusing to load the
three ships then in port and ordering the union to process its
grievance through the arbitration procedures specified in the
collective bargaining agreement.
After the three ships were loaded, President Carter
extended the trade embargo to include superphosphoric acid.
On
injunction.
court's

appeal,
The

the

first

jurisdiction.

CAS

reversed

question
Now

that

for

the
the

the

issuance
CA

trade

of

the

concerned

the

embargo

was

extended, JBT would be sending no further ships to Russia in
the

foreseeable

future,

and

the dispute might appear

to be

The CA found,

moot.

however,

that

class of cases that are "capable of

repetition,

review."

to

To

satisfy

this

rules, when the matter
must

be

shown

duration

that

that

expiration

it

and

exception

the

yet evading

normal

challenged

cannot

be

there

action

fully
is

a

is

of

litigated
likelihood

~~t

mootness

is not brought as a class action,

the

that

that ~

the dispute was of

such

prior
that

it

short
to

its

the

same

complaining party would again be subjected to the same action.
Given that it only takes a day or two to load a ship, if an
injunction

is

issued,

the ship will have departed

appellate court can review the matter.
"reasonable expectation that
be subjected
its policy.

to the

Further,

before an
there

is a

the same complaining party will

same action again."

The ILA maintains )

Russian troops are still in Afghanistan.

Turning to the merits, the CA found that a .... strike to
achiev~

Jt

\'

a political goal is a labor dispute within the meaning
i:!:'

...

-

of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

That Act provides that "No court

of

have

............

the

United

States

shall

jurisdiction

to

issue

any

restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any
case

involving

prohibit

or

a

strike.

in

the Act

out

growing
29

as

u.s.c.

of

any

§104 (a) .

labor
l l

"Labor

dis:eute"

...

diS:QUte"

"any controversy concerning

to
is

terms or

JH· t>f'

~

-J~A~uh

conditions

of

employment

or

concerning

the

association

\\

or ~~---.

representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing,

or

employment."

seeking

to

arrange

terms

or

conditions

of

Relying on an earlier panel decision of the CAS,

,.

..,,

United

States

1236

(CAS

Steel

1975),

Corp.
and

v.

United Mine Workers,

without

further

519 F. 2d

analysis,

the

CA

in

the

concluded that the dispute was a "labor dispute."
Having
affirmative,
Forge/

determined

the CA was

Boys

Market

the

threshold

confronted with

problem

of

question

the classic Buffalo

accommodating
-----

the

pro~

~rbitration policy '~f the LMRA with the ~hti-injunction policy

1

------

of Norris-LaGuardia.

-

In Buffalo Forge the Court found that a

sympathy strike by a union in violation of a no-strike clause
in
The

a

collective
Court

found

bargaining

agreement could not be enjoined.

that

Union has

"the

reason of any dispute
employer,

it or any of

gone on

strike

strike clause,

by

its members has with the

but in support of other local unions."

the question of whether

not

Certainly,

the sympathy strike violated the no-

and appropriate

remedies

subject to the arbitration procedures.

if

it did,

would

be

But the strike itself

could not be enjoined if it "was not over any dispute between
the

Union

and

the

employer"

subject

to

the

arbitration

provisions.
Similarly,
any

arbitrable

invasion

of

in this case the dispute was not "over"

grievance.

The dispute was over

Afghanistan--"The

asserted by JBT,

Union's

grievance

the Russian
is

not,

as

a complaint against JBT doing business with

the Soviets. It is a complaint against the actions of the USSR
itself."

No

arbiter

could

"[w)hile the question whether

resolve

that

grievance.

Thus

the strike itself violated the

\

I

parties'

agreement

is

arbitrable,

the

underlying

•

dispute

between the !LA and the Soviet Union is not."

II.

Discussion

There are two questions for the
or

not Norris-LaGuardia

has

any

Court: ~ whether

application at all

in

this

setting, and ~ if it does, whether Buffalo Forge should
be cut back to permit injunctions in such a case.

A.

Norris-LaGuardia and Political Strikes

The Court is presented with a question of statutory
interpretation
the

more

that would

difficult

settle

Buffalo

LaGuardia Act appl} es only
of [a] labor dispute."

this

Forge
to- ~ s

case without

controversy.

reaching

The Norris~

"i..nvolving or growing ou.t

Labor dispute is defined in the act as

"any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment
or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating

... or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of

employment."

1.

The Chief's Dissent from Denial

You may recall that the Court granted cert after the
Chief wrote a dissent from denial in which he argued that this

'•
I

..

8.

affair

was

not

within

the Norr is-LaGuardia Act.

The

Chief

argued as follows:
"A necessary prerequisite for application of
the Buffalo Forge doctrine is that there be a "labor
dispute" between the empoyer and the employees, as
that term is defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
There is no "labor dispute" here and there is no
basis in any of our decisions for applying NorrisLaGuard ia to poli tically-moti va ted work stoppages,
concerning subjects over which employers have no
control."

The Chief cited a decision of the CA2 for support--Khedivial
Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers International Union,278 F.2d 49, 5051

(CA2

1960) (political
Egyptian

boycott
of

Egyptian

in

for

with Israel

is not a

'labor dispute'), as well as a summary

affirmance

by

CAS--West

aff'd

refusal

to

dispute).
Assn.,

summarily,

load
See

grain
also

ships dealing

Gulf
Maritime
Assn.
v.
-------------------------------------

International Longshoremen's Assn.,
1975),

American

ships

retaliation

the

boycott

of

531
on

NLRB

332 F. 2d 99 2, 995

413 F. Supp. 372 (SD Tex.

F.2d

political
v.

574

(CAS

grounds,

International

1976) (union's
not

a

labor

Longshoremen's

(CA4 1964) (pol i tically-moti va ted ILA

boycott of all ships that were trading or had traded with Cuba
is not a

'labor dispute' within the meaning of §2(9)

of the

NLRA).
As a practical matter, since the Chief joined the 5-a4 )
majority in Buffalo Forge, this rationale may be the key to
majority if the CAS is to be reversed.

~

Jo

Yet

'---

there
the

the

argument

is

not altogether

easy to make--

is little in the way of legislative history one way or
other

while

unhelpful

in

precedents

analysis--and

both

th~re

are

are

few

some

in

risks

number

and

in adopting

this line of approach if you hope to get the Court to reverse
its Buffalo Forge position:
"political"
approach

the

Court

might

in Buffalo Forge

bifurcated

into

(1)

By arguing
seem

to

be

that disputes

a

dispute

nonarbi trable/poli tical grievance and
meaning of the no-strike clause.

that this dispute is
reaffirming

the

such as this can be

over
( 2)

an

underlying

a dispute over

the

Since the Chief joined the

majority in Buffalo Forge it is easier for him to adopt this
approach.

2.

The
covered

by

The Argument Against Coverage

argument

that

Norris-LaGuardia

this

political

runs

as

strike

follows.

is

not

First,

injunctions against political sympathy strikes was not one of
the

abuses

against

which

Norris-LaGuardia

was

aimed.

As

Justice Stevens explained in his dissent in Buffalo Forge, the

~S

Act was passed primarily in order to protect "labor's

ability ~

to organize and

histor ~

to bargain collectively.

It was the

vvv

of injunctions against strike activity in furtherance of union
organization,

recognition,

and

collective

bargaining,

rather

than judicial enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements,

.LUo

that

led

1932."

to

the

enactment

of

the

Norris-LaGuardia

Act

in

The statement of purpose preceding the Act identifies

this primary purpose.
Second,
may

indicate a

the

specific

language

of

limitation upon coverage.

Norris-LaGuardia
The definition of

"labor dispute" refers to "any controversy concerning terms or
conditions

of

employment,

representation."

or

association

concerning

or

The definition seems to focus on particular

working conditions and on the right to concerted activity.
Third,
the

several precedents from this Court and from

circuit courts

support a

limited

reading of

the

"labor

dispute"

definition.

u.s.

(1942), a fish processor sued a union of independent

143

fishermen

under

the

In Columbia

Sherman

River

Act.

The

Co.

v,

Hinton,

processor

asked

315

for

injunctive relief and the association argued that injunctive
relief was barred by Norris-LaGuardia.
to

the

union

are

individual

Fishermen who belong

entrepreneurs

employment relationship with any employer.

without

an

The Union acts as

a collective bargaining agency in the sale of fish caught by
its members.
Union

members

The Union's demand that processors buy only from
led

to

the

antitrust

action.

The

CA

Norris-LaGuardia applicable; the Court reversed:
"That a dispute among businessmen over the
terms of a contract for the sale of fish is
something different from a 'controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment •.. " calls for no
extended discussion
[T] he Act was not intended
to have application to disputes over the sale of
commodities."

found

~

.......

Similarly, in Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391
(1968),

the

question

was

whether

certain

union

u.s.

99

practices

imposed upon orchestra leaders, and resisted by these leaders
as violations of the antitrust laws, were such as to amount to
a labor dispute. Application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act would
exempt

the

union's practices

Court found
forcing

that

leaders

notion

of

a

The

the particular practices--e.g. price lists,
to

labor

presence of a

from the anti-trust laws.

favor

local

dispute

which

musicians--were
the

Court

within

defined

by

the
"the

job or wage competi ton or some other economic

inter-relationship

affecting

legitimate

union

interests

between the union members and the [employers]."
More to the point, in several lower court cases the
precise

sort of

strike--has

dispute

been held

in

this

case--a

to be outside of

political

sympathy

the Norr is-LaGuardia

Act.

In Khedivial Line v. Seafarers' International Union, 278

F. 2d

49

(CA2

1960) (Lumbard,

Moore,

Friendly) ,

the

employer

applied for an injunction when the union placed a picket line
around his ship to protest Nasser's boycott of American ships
doing

business

company.

with

Israel.

The

employer

was

an

Egyptian

The CA distinguished this Court decision in Marine

Cooks v. Panama Steamship Co., 1960, 362

u.s.

365:

"In the Marine Cooks case the foreign shipowner
was one of the persons alleged to be creating the
substandard wages and working conditions against
which defendants were protesting.
Here,
the
shipowner was not the cause of the picketers'
grievance.
[W] hatever had been done here was
the United Arab Republic's doing, not plaintiff's.

,, '.

12 •

.•. We do not believe the prohibition of the NorrisLaGuardia Act against the grant of injunctions in 'a
labor dispute' extends to picketing directed against
policies of the government of the owner of a vessel
as distingusihed from activities of the owner.
Broad as the Act's definition of 'labor dispute' is,
it is not broad enough to encompass that."

Fourth, the Court has recognized in applying §7 of
the NLRA--protecting acti vi tes that are for
and

protection"

employees may

of

be

employees--that

purely political

and

the "mutual aid
activities

some

not directed

"concerns of employees as employees." Eastex,
437

u.s.

556

(1978).

Certain

political

the

Inc. v. NLRB,

leafletting,

example, may not be protected by the labor
general,

to

by

laws.

Thus,

for
in

the courts treat political activity on a different

basis than activity directed to working conditions and terms
of employment in the traditional sense.

3.

The Argument for Coverage

/~:

Both the Union and the Solicitor General argue that
--------~--------

the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies--although
..___. the SG thinks that

~

the injunction was properly issued by the district court. They
point to language in opinions of this Court suggesting that
the Act is not to be interpreted narrowly.
Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co.,
And

they

point

to

the

362

decision of

u.s.

See Marine Cooks &
365,

the Court

369

(1960).

in New Negro

l~?

.

.

13 •

Alliance

v.

Sanitary Grocery Co.,

303

u.s.

552

(1938).

In

that case, the Court found that the Act did apply to prohibit
an injunction of picketing of a store by members of a civic
group who were

seeking

to encourage

the

black workers.

That the picketers were not union organizers

or store employees, made no difference:
expressly

applied

to

labor

store

to hire more

By its terms the Act

controversies

"regardless

of

whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of

employer

and

employee."

race discrimination rather

That
than,

the
for

source of dispute was
example,

discrimination

against union members, made no difference either:
"The Act does not concern itself with the
The
background or the motives of the dispute.
of
desire
for
fair
and
equitable
conditions
employment on the part of persons of any race
and the removal of discriminations against them
is quite as important .•• as fairness and equity in
terms and conditions of employment can be to trade
or craft unions or any form of labor organization or
association.
• •• There is no justification in the
apparent purposes or the express terms of the Act
for limiting its definition of labor disputes and
cases arising therefrom by excluding those which
arise with respect to discrimination in terms and
conditions of employment based upon difference of
race or color."

Rather more persuasively, it is also argued that the ~
dispute here is nothing if not a labor dispute.
-

The company

........

~~
'."

• h •

.A'l

complained to the district court tha 0> the Union was refusing ~
to load cargoes headed for the Soviet Union in violatin of the
collective
existence

bargaining
of

a

agreement.

dispute

between

The

company

alleged

the

parties

to

a

the
labor

.,

)

,.

.,.

agreement

and

they

rested

their

entitlement

to

injunctive

relief on the rights arising from the labor agreement.
1(

Quite

\..

simply the dispute here concerns the application of the no...... ..-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement.
This
----------------'-------

must

be

a

controversy

employment."

Indeed,

J

"concerning

the

terms

or

conditions

of

not

to

strike

by

agreement

contract a "term or condition" of employment.
decision
which

in Khedivial,

had

picketing

no

supra,

collective

union,

here

involving

bargaining

a

Unlike
foreign

agreement

is

the CA2
shipowner

with

the

the dispute centers around the rights

guaranteed in the collective bargaining agreement. 1

3.

opinions

Conclusion

I

think

of

the

it

is

Court,

fairly
cited

apparent

by

either

that
side,

none

of

the

settles

the

question of whether or not the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to
a political dispute.

I am convinced by the SG's argument that
~

this

matter

arises

out

of

a

labor

dispute.

The Company

is

1 The SG also argues that since the strike was over an

arbitrable dispute--concerning cargo-handling assignments and the
employer's right to choose its customers--the matter must be a
labor dispute. He suggests further that even had there been no
dispute over the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,
the matter might still be a labor dispute: the essence of ~ the
matter is that em lo ees are refusing to acce t their work
aqs1gnments. The employer/emp oyee relat1onship is at the heart
of the controversy.

..

'
'

'

seeking

an

injunction

because

it claims

that

the

union has

given up the right to strike no matter what the reason.
was the quid pro guo for
arbitration.

This

the Company's agreement to binding

Khedivial

is

distinguishable--no

collective

bargaining agreement existed--and no other case from any other
circuit conflicts with the decision of the CAS here that the
dispute is within the Act.
As I
Chief

takes

Forge.

indicated above, I can well understand why the

the

position

that

he

does.

He

joined Buffalo

The Court in that case drew a distinction between the

dispute

over

application

of

the

no

strike

clause

and

dispute over the under lying "nonarbi trable" grievance.

the

He is

therefore accustomed to a mode of analysis that looks to the
grieva ~e

underlying

of the arbitration

and considers the grievance to be outside

agreeme~t

(non-arbitrable) or, as here, to

be outside of the Norris LaGuardia Act.
But the dissent in Buffalo Forge, which you joined,

-----

reject_g_d the significance attached by the Court to the fact
that

the

employer

underlying
had

agreed

grievance
to

arbitration

strikes were to be illegal:
of

a

no-strike

arbitration

clause

process,

but

was

on

arbitrable.

the

basis

that

The
all

"A sympathy strike in violation

does
if

not

not
the

directly

clause

is

frustrate
not

the

enforceable

against such a strike, it does frustrate the more basic policy
of

motivating

employers

to

agree

to

binding

arbitration

by

giving them an effective 'assurance of uninterrupted operation

C ~

s

~~

J.O.

during the term of the agreement.'" 428

u.s.

at 423-424.

The

majority recognized that the agreement to arbitrate might be
enforced
given

by

was

injunction and

likewise

that the arbitrator's award once

enforceable

by

injunction.

Yet

it made

little sense to permit an injunction after the arbitrator had
reached his conclusion that the sympathy strike was illegal,
but not permit the court to

issue an injunction pending the

arbitration where it was clear that the strike would be found
illegal by the arbitrator.

The point was that the parties had

agreed to settle their differences--all of their differences-through arbitration.
If
dissent

in

you

continue

Buffalo

Forge

to

accept

then

I

the

think

of

the

~~

view

the

~

viewpoint
you

dispute in this case to be a labor dispute.

must

The parties have

agreed to settle their differences through arbitration.

The

union

The

has

agreed

to

sweeping

a

no

strike

clause.

~

collective bargaining agreement appears to have been violated.

~~\

Surely this is a labor dispute.

;;I

short,

In

and

putting

aside

the

difficulties

4~
0

f

putting together a Court, I would not decide the case on the
basis that Norris LaGuardia simply does not apply.

I

does

apply

Buffalo

essentially

Forge

was

for

wrong:

the
the

same

reason

employer

/.}_ ;:;;;:
~~

I think it ~

that

thought

/,U).

he

I

think
had

an

~ -p~
~~

~

agreement that would put a stop to all strikes and it is that ~~
agreement that he is seeking to enforce.

On the other

hand, ~~~

if you think~ at )the Court will not overrule Buffalo Forge or

.L I •

if

you

think

that

Court ought not

to

reconsider a

case so

recently decided, then I think there may be some justification
in

following

the

characterizes
grievance.

the

position.

Chief's
dispute

in

terms

Forge

Buffalo

of

the

underlying

So may you--if you are content to follow Buffalo

~
~

Forge.

~~
B.

Applying Boys Market and Buffalo Forge

you

If
application,

the

find
case

that

is

Norris-LaGuardia

over.

But

has

if Norris-LaGuardia

no
is

applicable the Court will have to consider how Boys Market and
Buffalo Forge apply to this case.
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770,

u.s.

398

235

(1970),

the Court reversed its holding in

Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,

370 U.S. 195

(1962), that

the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia preclude a
federal

court from enjoining a

strike

in breach of the no-

strike clause of the collective bargaining agreement.
upon the

"devastating

arbitration
obligations

implications for

agreements
if

equitable

and

their

remedies

Relying

the enforceability of

accompanying
were

not

no-strike

available,"

and

relying further on a need to accommodate Norris-LaGuardia and
the

LMRA,

with

its pro-arbitration policy,

contemporary conditions,

the Court

found

in the

that an

light of
injunction

was appropriately granted on the facts of that case.

.,

'·

In Buffalo Forge,

however,

the Court narrowed Boys

Market by holding that an injunction could not issue when the
ll

, ,

grievance underlying the union's strike was nonarbitrable.

In

that case the union was striking to show sympathy for another
union
that

negotiating wi ththe
an

arbitrator

grievance.

same employer.

could

do

to

remove

There was
the

nothing

source

of

the

The Court found, therefore, that since the strike

was not "over any dispute between the Union and the employer
that was even remotely subject to the arbitration provisions
of

the

contract,"

obligation
Boys

it

did

to arbitrate,"

Market

not
and

I

analysis.

amount

evasion of

"an

therefore fell outside of

the

have

to

already

an

described

above

the

Forge

is

dissent by Justice Stevens, which you joined.
simply

I

cannot

distinguishable from this case.

The SG and the employer make

the !LA "had any right under

agreement

to

dictate

JBT's

are

arbitrable under

agreement.
not

selection

Presumably

These last two
.

b

t h e collect1ve

terms of

~

.

tZ<.A-.hf..4.7££L~:AA

It

~

~

its ~

of

the ~

dispute~
..

~

arga1n1ng~ ~

The SG claims that for this reason the Court need ~/-

overrule

reverse.

the

~~~--

the collective ' /

customers or to object to cargo-handling assignments where
cargo is ••• politically offensive."

~

is~

It is not only between the ILA and Russia.

is also whether
bargaining

Buffalo

The SG argues that the underlying dispute

a game at tempt.
multifaceted.

how

see

Yet
in

its
he

decision
does

Buffalo

not
Forge

in

Buffalo

explain
the

how

unions

Forge

in

this

can

refusal

order
be

to ~

true~

to cross

a

picket line and decision to stage a sympathy strike was also a
dispute

as

collective
labor

to

whether

bargaining

policies

with

the

union

agreement,
respect

had
to

the

right,

dictate

to other

happy

with

the

ease

with

which

dispute"

employer's
one

demonstrates
But

Buffalo Forge.

treatment of

can
how

I

other

questionable

the

employer's
whether

the

if they were not

recharacterize

do not

the

unions or

employees could object to work assignments

under

the

workers.

the

The

"underlying

holding

was

in

think it provides a basis for

distinguishing the case.
Similarly,
overrule

Buffalo

distinguished

on

in

addition

Forge,

JBT

the

basis

to

urging

argues

that

the

the

that
work

it

Court

to

can

be

stoppage

issue

related to a disagreement over the employer's right to choose
its

customers

as

part

of

its

exercise

of

its

management

prerogatives--expressly protected in the collective bargaining
agreement.

What

choose

business

its

was

at

stake

partners.

was

management's

Yet

one

could

ability

equally

to

well

argue that what was at stake in Buffalo Forge was management's
prerogatives--viz. its ability to offer terms of employment to
other workers.
Buffalo Forge held that when the dispute between the
employer and the union centers on the application of the nostrike clause, that dispute is arbitrable, but no injunction
will

issue

pending

arbitration.

I

think it disingenuous

to

suggest that the dispute in this case is more than a dispute

.'

over the application of the no-strike clause.

But it is worth

thinking

distinguish

or

can be made,

it

some

more

about

limit Buffalo Forge.

these

attempts

to

If a convincing case

might be the best way to decide the matter.
Of course Buffalo Forge

is a

fat

target.

Because

you joined the dissent in that case, I have not undertaken to
fully critique
Also

you

have

management's

the case.

The dissent

written recently to

other

remedies

in

is fairly convincing.

indicate how limited are

cases

in

which

a

no-strike

------------~~--------------------------------See your concurring opinion
clause
has been breached.

in

Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 49 U.S.L.W. 4473 (May 4, 1981).
I attach a copy of your opinion in that case.

If you would

like more on Buffalo Forge, I can provide it.

III.

In

Conclusion

sum,

I

think

that

there

are

essentially

three

courses you can follow:
(1)
Buffalo Forge,

you can
and

adhere

hope

that

to the dissenting position in
this

position

Jl.,o ~ ~ ~.

majority,

now

~

1M_ fJ't./L~- tJ- ~ ~ ~
(2)

you

can

affirm,

stare decisis and Buffalo Forge,

regretfully,

-

N~;

on

-

C

attracts

'f w».

the

a

basis of

.......

or,
you

(3)

might

if you feel compelled to follow Buffalo Forge,

consider

that

the

matter

is

outside

of

Norris-

LaGuardia altogether as a political question.
I do not see a way to distinguishing Buffalo Forge.
Rumor

has

it

that

Justice

Brennan,

a

dissenter

in

Buffalo

Forge, will vote to affirm because he does not think that the
Court can keep flipflopping on these issues.

A third position

is available, although I do not think that it or Buffalo Forge
makes

much

sense.

If you

feel

compelled

to

follow Buffalo

Forge, because it is the "law," then you may look at the case
through the eyes of the Buffalo Forge majority, permitting the
"underlying grievance"
that

the

to characterize

"real" dispute here

the case.

If we say

is between Russia and the ILA,

then it is certainly plausible to say that this dispute is not
covered

by

Norris-LaGuardia.

In

the

end

this

may

be

the

position that attracts a court.

•.
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SUMMARY:

This

lined with No.

case

refuses

~. V

ASS'N :

Feder~vil

probably

enjoined

upheld

the

injunction
Forge.

have

been

to

provide

such work

order
on

to

the

services

International

to

any

arbitrate,

cargo

The DC ordered arbitration

but

of

the resp

ship carrying

stoppages pending arbitration.

authority

Petrs argue

straight-

Because of its political views,

bound to or from the Soviet Union.
and

should

Timely

80-1058, Hampton Roads Shipping v.

Longshoremen's Ass'n.
union

~

set

as ide

the

Norris-LaGuardia

The CAS

anti-strike
and

Buffalo

that the work stoppage was outside Norris.,

LaGuardia and
Petrs

also

that

urge

there is a conflict wi t h CA2 on this point.

the

Court

to

reconsider

it ~

5-4

decision

in

1ts~ -t't~~~/0~-v\J ~-~.

-2-

(

Buffalo Forge.
'

bulk

FACTS:

Petr Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, !DC., maintains a

marine

shipping

terminal

in

Jacksonville,

With

FL.l

longshoremen who are members of Local 1408 of the resp ILA, JBT
loads superphosphoric acid (SPA) onto ships destined for the USSR
from Jacksonville.
On

in

1/4/80,

Afghanistan,

response

President

Carter

shipments to the USSR.

to

issued

the
an

USSR's
embargo

invasion
against

of

grain

The embargo expressly exempted unshipped

grain committed to the USSR under a 1975 agreement, and did not
extend to non-grain products such as SPA.
A few days later, resp adopted a resolution providing that
its members would not handle any cargo bound to or coming from
the

USSR.

No

action

was

sought

from

the

employers

of

union

members and nothing that the employers did could have eliminated
the cause of the boycott.
On

1/15/80,

a

Norwegian

ship

entered

the

Jacksonville to take on SPA for transport to the USSR.
to the ILA resolution,

Port

of

Pursuant

Local 1408 refused to handle the cargo.

At no time did Local 1408 refuse to handle any other cargo.
The collective bargaining agreement between JBT and Local
1408

contains

a

no-strike

clause,2

v

a

clause

requiring

./

1 The other petrs are Hooker Chemical Corp. and Occidental
Petroleum Corp, both corporate parents of JBT.

-

~ The no-strike clause prohibits

('-'

j
-...._

......

"any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever, walkout,
suspension of work, curtailment or limitation of production,
slowdown, or any other interruption or stoppage, total or
partial, of the employer's operation for any cause
whatsoever."

•••

, .... Jo"f
, ..

I

·~

'

o

-3-

arbitration,3
employer's

a

clause

business

and

stating
the

that

direction

the

management

of

of

the ·workforce

the
"are

exclusively vested in the Employer as fucntions of Management,"
and a clause stating that the agreement is
"intended to cover all matters affecting wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and
the Employers will not be required to negotiate on
any further matters affecting these or other subjects
not specifically set forth in this Agreeme n t."
JBT sought to compel arbitration, and pending arbitration
it sought a TRO and a preliminary injunction to halt the boycott.
The U.S.

govt appeared and advised

prohibition

of

export

of

SPA

to

the DC that
the

USSR,

there

that

was

no

appropriate

governmental action had been taken to controL exports to the USSR
in order to protect the public interest, and that "private action
by longshore workers to interfere with such exports are [sic] not
warranted."
The

DC

(Susan

pending arbitration,

Black,
enjoined

MD

Fla)

the

ordered

arbitration

union from refusing

aboard 3 Norwegian ships then in port.

and,

to work

The DC held that Norris-

LaGuardia was not applicable, reasoning that a purely political
strike does not "involv[e] or grow[] out of any labor dispute" as

~terms are used in §§4(a) and 13(c) of that statute, 29 USC
those
§§104 (a), 113 (c), and that the ordinary criteria, including the
public interest as voiced by the U.S. govt, required entry of the
preliminary injunction.

3 The arbitration clause provides that "Matters under
dispute which cannot be promptly settled between the Local and an
individual Employer" shall be referred to arbitration.

I

~. I .:

,f

'

... ...

~--·-"'

,._.,.,.,.,

-4-

(_~

3

The

Jacksonville.

ships

were

then

loaded

with

SPA

and

left

Late in February, the President extended the trade

embargo with the USSR to include
SPA.
,.The union appealed the
decision

substantially

injunction,

burdened

its

arguing

members'

that

first

the DC' s
amendment

rights and that the case was not moot.
HOLDING BELOW:
an

ED

La

requiring

Consolidating this case with its review of

decision

that

the

to

!LA

had

load

enforced
grain,4

some
CAS

arbitration

upheld

the

awards

order

to

arbitrate but set aside the anti-strike injunction, reasoning as
follows:
(1) The case is not moot because the controversy qualifies
as

capable

record

of

is

repetition

unclear

but

evading

concerning

SPA,

review

and

statements

"[w] hile
made

at

the
oral

argument indicate that some is still being loaded for shipment to
the Soviet Union".
(2) The injunction against the concerted refusal to work on
certain ships violated neither the 1st nor the 13th Amendments.
(3)

... .

to

achieve

a

--------political

goal

is

a

"labor

dispute" covered by Norris-LaGuardia.

United States Steel Corp.

v. United Mine Workers,

(CAS 1975), cert. denied,

428

(

A strike

US

910

(1976)

Sl9 F2d 1236

(Brown,

Wisdom,

Coleman)

(pre-arbitration

4 In the ED La case, the CA affirmed t he DC's decision to
the extent that it enforced arbitration awa r ds enjoining work
stoppages as to specific vessels which were the subject of
specific grievances. TheCA found error, ho wever, in the DC's
decision enjoining such work stoppages with respect to grain
destined for the Soviet Union under U.S. ex port license on any
vessels that arrived thereafter in the Port of New Orleans.
[See
§9 of Norris-LaGuardia, 29 USC §109.]
---

...~

•.""

-5injunction against coal miners' strike to protest the importation
of South African coal by an electric power company, although not
aimed at the miners' employer, held barred by Norris-LaGuardia).
The CA found

it

States

with

Steel

Longshoremen's
summarily,
grounds,
a

ship

"difficult satisfactorily to reconcile" United
West

Ass'n,

531 F2d 574

Gulf
413

Maritime

FSupp

{CAS 1976)

Ass'n

372

v.

{SD

International

Tex

1975),

aff'd

{union's refusal on political

in violation of a no-strike agreement, to load grain on
bound

dispute

for

the

triggering

Soviet

Union

does

Norris-LaGuardia).

not

The

present

CA

a

cited

labor

Khedival

Line, SAE v. Seafarers International Union, 278 F2d 49 {CA2 1960)
{Lumbard,

Moore,

Friendly;

p/c)

{politically-motivated

SIU

boycott of Egyptian ships to retaliate for Egyptian blacklist of

c'-

American ships that dealt with Israel held not to trigger NorrisLaGuardia since the plaintiff employer "was not the cause of the
picketers'

grievance";

federal

jurisdiction),

Ass'n.

See

also

NLRB

but
as
v.

injunction
in

accord

denied

with

International

["Ocean Shipping"], 332 F2d 992 {CA4 1964)
dissenting)

for

West

failure

Gulf

of

Maritime

Longshoremen's

Ass'n

{Sobeloff, Bell; Bryan

{politically-motivated ILA boycott of all ships that

were trading or had traded with Cuba held not a "labor dispute"
within the meaning of §2{9) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as

amended;

labor

refusing enforcement of NLRB order finding

practice

ships).

But

in union's

to

the

refusal

extent of

any

to provide

workers

inconsistency,

unfair

for

such

the CA found

United States Steel more persuasive than the other cases.

('-

{4)
the

"While the question whether the s trike itself violated

parties'

agreement

is

arbitrable,

the

between the ILA and the Soviet Union is not."
• •. .::"!_.... ..,......

underlying

dispute

Since arbitration

-6-

C.
I,

could not "resolve the grievance between the !LA and the Soviet

'

Union," petrs could not bring themselves within the Boys Markets
- -Buffalo Forge exception to Norris-LaGuardia.
CONTENTIONS:
applies.)

Petrs

(Question

1:

there

a

say

is

Whether
direct

Norris-LaGuardia

conflict

with

CA2's

Khedival case and that since the NLRA and Norris-LaGuardia are in
pari materia and should be construed in like manner, the decision
in the present case is also at odds with CA4' s Ocean Shipping_.
(Question
Buffalo

2)

Petrs

Forge.

The

argue

that

employer

the
in

CA's

this

decision

case

misapplies

received

explicit

contractual recognition of its right to manage its own business.
Any disagreement about
that

clause

contract.

was

the scope of

subject

to

the

authority

mandatory

reserved

arbitration

by

under· the

Such a disagreement is precisely what happened here.

(Question 3) Petrs urge the Court to reconsider Buffalo Forge in
light of the effects manifested here:

specifically, unions are

permitted to engage in political strikes despite having pledged
not

to

strike

employers

are

"for

any

reason

being denied

whatsoever";

more

generally,

any genuine quid pro quo for

their

commitments to arbitrate grievances.
Resps reply that the CA made a straightforward application
of Buffa1o Forge.

Also, in

"th~

CA4 has come out the same way.

precise situation of this case",
Hampton Roads Shipping Ass'n v.

International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 631 F2d 282 (CA4 1980), petn
for cert. pending, No. 80-1058

(same conf. list and sheet as the

present case, but not straight-lined).

( ..._

Respsargue

that this is

a "labor dispute" because it involves a disagreement between the
employer and the union over whether the latter is contractually
required

to

work

in

the

circumstances
,'."'t';• , .

.• .

..,

of
I<

'"'·'•,

this

case.

Resps

distinguish Ocean Shipping and Khedival on the ground that the
unions'

employers were not involved in those cases.

note that Khedival long preceded Buffalo Forge.
not

punish

anyone

Accordingly,

it

whose

is

conscience

absurd

to

The union "does
sensitive. •i

less

is

characterize

Resps also

this

as

a

dispute

between the employer and the union over management prerogatives.
DISCUSSION:
case

or

In my opinion,

Hampton

the only reason to take

Roads Shipping would

be

to

this

reconsider Buffalo

Forge.
In

saying

it

is

not

the

union attempts

Norris-LaGuardia.
dispute"

but

management's

~ That

c f(

sort

Buffalo

that
rights,

of

inconsistency,
Thus,

Forge.

Shipping,

decided

identical

to those of

that

Khedival

the

one

Buffalo

tension between Khedival and
question.

of

before

the CAS.

predates

an

there

is

arbitrable

however,

views

week

that

the
CAS

a
CA4

it

in

says

result

Hampton
this

See 631 F2d at 28S.
Forge

over

both ways.

natural

decided

"labor

dispute

to have

is

a

nothing

of

Roads

case,

are

The fact
about

the

this case on the Norris-LaGuardia

However, Khedival can be distinguished on the ground

that the boycott in that case was directed at the policies of the
government

of

boycott

more

is

the

employer,

nearly

whereas

directed

at

in

the

present

policies of

the

case

the

employer.

That brings the present case closer to Marine Cooks & Stewards v.
Panama Shipping Co.,
vessel

by

American

362 US
union

to

36S

(1960)

protest

(picketing of Liberian

the

effect

of

"flags

of

convenience" on wages and working ' conditions of American seamen
held a "labor dispute" triggering Norris-LaGuardia).
Application of Buffalo Forge to Political Boycotts.
appears

to be

no principled basis for

There

distinguishing political

-8boycotts from sympathy strikes for purposes of arbitrability.

If

that is so, there can be little doubt that the CA has correctly
applied Buffalo Forge.
Reconsideration of Buffalo Forge.

In their Buffalo Forge

dissent, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens argued
that if a union has contractually promised not to strike for any
reason,

but then strikes during the term of the contract, a DC
In my

has the power to enjoin the strike pending arbitration.
opinion,

post-Buffalo Forge experience shows the correctness of

the dissent.

The record in the present case, however, does not

contain the kind of empirical data that would be needed to reach
such

c

a

judgment.

Also,

since

the problem from

the employer's

perspective is economic damage, some tension might be relieved if
the

Court

were

to

allow

individual employees.

LMRA

§301

damages

Complete Auto Transit,

suits

against

Inc. v. Reis, No.

79-1777, to be argued February 24.
Assuming

the

Court

remains

persuaded

of

the

wisdom

of

Buffalo Forge as applied to sympathy strikes, this petn should be
denied.

If the Court wishes to hear one of these ILA political

boycott cases,
Shipping.

the present case is preferable to Hampton Roads

Judge Rubin's opinion

is more exhaustive than Judge

Sprouse's opinion in Hampton Roads Shipping;

the latter does not

discuss whether this boycott is covered by Norris-LaGuardia.
Response filed.
02/03/81

Coleman

Opns in petn

~·
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 80-1045, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v.
I.L.A.

No . 80-1058 , Hampton Roads Shipping Ass 'n v.
I.L.A.

I enclose a draft of 1 my proposed dissent from
denial of cert in this case .
Regards ,

'--'I
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FIRST DRAFT
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No . 80-1045 , Jacksonville Bulk Terminals , Inc. , et al. v .
International Longshoremen ' s Ass ' n , et al .

No . 80-1058, Hampton Roads Shipping Ass ' n , et al. v .
International Longshoremen's Ass'n , et al .

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER , dissenting .
In these cases two Courts of Appeals overturned preliminary
injunctions ordering the International Longshoremen ' s Associatio n
and Locals of that Association, pending arbitration , to cease and
desist from refusihg to handle certain cargo bound to or from the
Soviet Union .

The work stoppages were carried out , in clear

violation of collective bargaining agreements , pursuant to a
resolution of the Association entered into -in response to the
Soviet Union ' s invasion of Afghanistan .

They also went beyond

~.

...

the official retaliatory embargo imposed by the United States on
certain trade with the Soviet Union.
Each of the pertinent collective bargaining agreements
contains a clause prohibiting any strike or work stoppage, a
clause requiring arbitration of all grievances, a clause stating
that the management of the employer's business and the direction
of the workforce "are exclusively vested in the Employer as
functions of Management," and a clause stating that the agreement
is
"intended to cover all matters affecting wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment and ...
the Employers will not be required to negotiate on any
further matters affecting these or other subjects not
specifically set forth in this Agreement."
The employers sought to compel arbitration; pending arbitration
they sought temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions to halt the plainly illegal work stoppages.
In No. 80-1045, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of

Florid~

ordered arbitration and, pending

arbitration, enjoined the union from refusing to work aboard 3
named ships then in port.

The court held that the Norris-

LaGuardia Act was not applicable, reasoning that a purely
political strike does not "involv[e] or grow[] out of any labor
dispute" as those terms are used in §§4(a) and 13(c) of that
statute,l and that the ordinary criteria, including the public

1 29 U.S.C. §§104(a), 113(c)
provides:

(1976).

Section 4(a)

"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to

3,
interest as voiced by the United States in argument to the
District Court,2 required entry of the preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals reversed.

New Orleans Steamship Association

v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (C.A.5 1980).
In No. 80-1058, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia also issued a preliminary
injunction pending arbitration.

That court based its decision

primarily on the management discretion clause in the agreement.
The Court of Appeals reversed.

Hampton Roads Shipping

Association v. International Longshoremen's Association, 631 F.2d
282

(C.A.4 1980) .
Both Courts of Appeals took the view that the anti-

injunction staridards of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as elaborated in

issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to
prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in
such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing ,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
"(a ) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in
any relation of employment ...
"
Section 13(c ) provides :
"The term 'labor dispute ' includes any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment , or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating , fixing ,
maintaining , changing , or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employement , regardless of whether or not the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of employer and employee . "
2 The United States advised the District Court that there
was no prohibition of export of the products in question to the
U.S.S.R. , that appropriate governmental action had been taken to
control exports to the U.S.S.R . in order to protect the public
interest, and that "private action by longshore workers to
interfere with such exports are [sic] not warranted ."

t.
..
;

r

Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 US 235 (1970); and
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 US 397
(1976), apply to these cases.

Noting that the obvious,

underlying "dispute" between the union and the U.S.S.R. cannot be
resolved by the arbitration,3 the Courts of Appeals concluded
that Buffalo Forge precluded the injunctions.
That approach misses the point.

A necessary prerequisite

for application of the Buffalo Forge doctrine is that there be a
"labor dispute" between the employer and the employees , as that
term is defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
113 ( c )

( 19 7 6 ) .

29 U.S.C. §§104(a),

The r e i s no " 1 abo r d i s put e " her e and there i s no

basis in any of our decisions for applying ; Norris-LaGuardia to
purely political work stoppages, concerning subjects over which
the employer has no control.
courts s o recognize.

Prior decisions of other federal

See Khedival Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers

International Union, 278 F2d 49

(CA2 1960)

(politically-motivated

boycott of Egyptian ships to retaliate for Egyptian blacklist of
American ships that dealt with Israel is not a "labor dispute"
triggering Norris-LaGuardia);

West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v.

International Longshoremen 's Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex.
1975), aff'd summarily, 531 F.2d 574 (C.A.5 1976)

(union's

refusal on political grounds, in violation of a no-strike

3 The Fifth Circuit remarked, "Unfortunately, no
arbitrator can tell the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan."
New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, supra , at 467. That, of course,
begs the question: the arbitrator can command the Union not to
strike.

v.
agreement, to load grain on a ship bound for the Soviet Union
does not present a "labor dispute").

See also NLRB v.

International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (C.A.4 1964)
(politically-motivated ILA boycott of all ships that were trading
or had traded with Cuba is not a "labor dispute" within the
meaning of §2(9) of the National Labor Relations Act).
The present cases plainly do not involve "labor disputes"
within the meaning of Norris-LaGuardia.

Although the injunctions

must reflect sensitivity to First and Thirteenth Amendment
values,4 the work stoppages at issue clearly do not remotely
warrant the additional protective umbrella of the national labor
policy.
Because both Courts of Appeals have, in my view, erroneousl y
viewed a strike to achieve a purely political goal of the Union
as a "labor dispute" reached .bY Norris-LaGuardia , and because I
do not believe in any event that our decision in Buffalo Forge
precludes anti-strike injunctions in these cases , I would grant
certiorari an d summarily reverse the judgments of the Courts of
Appeals.

Our caseload problems cannot justify tolerance of suc h

egregious abuse of judicial power as manifest in these holdings.

4 Noting that none of the respondents was enjoined from
speaking and that the injunctions prohibit only concerted work
stoppages, the Fifth Circuit rejected respondents ' claims that
the injunctions violated First and Thirteenth Amendment rights.
New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, supra , at 462-463.

·-...

March 12, 1981

No. 80-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. I.L.A.
No. 80-1058 Hampton Roads Shipping Ass 1 n. v. I.L.A.

Dear Chief:
I approve of your draft of a proposed dissent from
denial of cert, as I do not understand Buffalo Forge as
reaching •political• rather than •1abor 1 disputes.
I agree with John, however, that the question is
an important one, apparently arises with some frequency, and
I therefore think it would be best to grant the case.
In sum, my first vote is to grant, and failing
three other votes to take the case, I would like for you to
add my name to my dissent.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

LFP/lab
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 12, 1981

Re:

80-1045 - Jacksonvile Bulk Terminals v.
I.L.A.
80-1058 - Hampton Roads Shipping Assn.
v. I.L.A.

Dear Chief:
Although you make a substantial case for
summary reversal, I think it may be better to hear
argument in these cases. After full argument, we
might decide to confine Buffalo Forge to the
sympathy strike situation and discourage the
extension of its reasoning to different fact
situations such as this.
Respectfully,

/L
~he

Chief Justice
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ~A¥FJAR
v..

JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS, INC., ET
,
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION ET AL.

AL,

~N

STATE~

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CER'l'IQHARI T() THE UNITED
cqUHT OF APPEALS FQR TI!E FIFTH CIHCUIT

HAMP::FON
E.OADS
SHIPPING A-SSOCIATION, E'r
•
J.
,.
INTE~NATIONAL LONGSHO;REMEN'S
ASSOCIATION EJT AL.
~

AL,

v.
•

' flN PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATEE\
CQURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIHCUIT

Nos. 80-1045 and 80-1058. Decided March -, 1981

CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, dissenting.
In these cases two Courts of Appeals overturned prelim
inary injunctions ordering the International Longshoremen's
Association and Locals of that Association, pending arbitration, to cease and desist from refusing to handle certain cargo
bound to or from the Soviet Ui1ion. The work stoppages
were carried out, in clear violation oi collective-bargaining
agreements, pursuant to a resoiutioii. o'i the Association entered into in response to the Soviet Union's invasion of
( Afghanistan.1
Each of the pertinent collective-bargaining agreements
contains a clause 12rohibiting any strike or work stoEEa.ge, a
tJlause requi'ring arbitration of all grievances, a clause stating
that the management of the empioyer's business and the direction of the workforce "are exclusively vested in the Employer as functions of Management," and a clause stating
that the agreement is
"intended to cover all matters a.ffecting wages, hours,
8

.
(

"

..

1

The work stoppages al,;o went beyond the official retaliatory embargo

impo~ed by the United States on certain tfa& with the Soviet Union•

..
~
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and other terms and conditions of employment and .. ,
the Employers will not be required to negotiate on any
further matters affecting these or other subjects not specifically set forth in this Agreement."
{

The employers sought to compel arbitration; pending arbitratior1 they secured temporary restraining orders and preliminary· injunctions to halt the :elainly illegal work stoppages.
In No. 80-1045, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida ordered arbitration and, pending
arbitration, enjoined the union from refusing to work aboard ·
3 named ships then in port The court held that the NorrisLaGuardia Act was not applicable, reasoning that a purely
political strike does not "in vol v [ e] or grow [] out of any
labor dispute" as those terms are used in §§ 4 (a) and 13 (c)
of that statute/ and that the ordinary criteria, including the
public interest as voiced by the United States in argument
to the District Court, 8 required entry of the preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed. New Orleans
Bteamship Assn. v. General Longshore W orker.s, 626 F. 2d
455 (CA5 1980).
29 U. S. C. §§ 104 (a), 113 (c) (1976). Section 4 (a) provide~:~:
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any ca:;e invulv~
ing or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any per:>on or persons
participating or intere:;ted in sucl1 dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
" (a) Cea:>ing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment . ..."
Section 13 (c) providel:l :
"The term 'laiJor di~pute' includeb any controversy concerning terms or
conditiunt~ of employment, or con<!erning the a8Sociation or repre::~entation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
8 The United Stat~s advised the District Court that there was no pro...
hibition of export of the products in question to the U. S. S. R. , that appropriate governmental action had been taken to control exports to the
U. S. S. R. in order to protect the public interest, and that "private action
by longshore workel.1l to interfere ·with such exports are [sic] not
1

wa:n:ante~."

~.

HCKSONV!LLE BULK 'TERMINALS v. LONGSHOREMEN'S 3

In No. 80-1058, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia also issued a preliminary
injunction pending arbitration. That court based its decision primarily on the management discretion clause in the
agreement. 'The Court of Appeals reversed. Hampton
Roads Shippiny Assn. v. International Longshoremen's Assn.;
'31 F. 2d 282 (CA4 1980).
On appeal, both Courts of Appeals took the view that the
4 'i- ( Jl/ ~
anti-injunction standards of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as ~
elaborated in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of ~· _
America, 428 U.S. 397 (1976); and Boys Market, Inc. v. Re.. .
tail Clerks Union, 398 D. S. 235 (1970), apply to these cases, ~
Noting the obvious, that the underlying "dispute" between h...J-,ru-zA-L~
Lhe union and the U. S. S. R. cannot be resolved by the arbi- /~- ~ ~ -- --. ~ tration, 1 the Court of Appeals concluded that Buffalo Forge
~
precluded the injunctions.
~ ~
That approach wholly misses the point. A necessary prerequisite for application of the Buffalo Forge doctrine is that
there be a "labor dispute" between the employer and the employees, as that term is defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
There is no "labot dispute" here and there is no basis in auyof our decisions for applying Norris-LaGuardia to politicallymotivated work stoppages, concerning subjects over _which
employers have no control. Decisions of other federal courts
'so recognize. See KhediviaZ Line, S. A. E. v. Seafarers International Union, 278 F. 2d 49, 5Q-51 (CA2 1960) (politicallymotivated boycott of Egyptian ships to retaliate for Egyptian
blacklist of Ametl.can shl.ps that deait with Israel is uot a
"labor dispute" triggering Norris-LaGuardia); liVest Gulf
Maritime Assn. v. lnternational Longshoremen's Assn., 413
F. Supp. 372 (SD Tex. 1975), aff'd summarily, 531 F. 2d 574
(CA5 1976) (union's refusal on poliLical grounds, in violation
of a no-strike agreement, to load grain on a ship bound for

C':/4

"0

1

4 The Fifth Circuit renmrked, "1Jnfortunutely, no arbitrator cuu tell the
Soviets to Withdraw from Afghani::~tanf' New Orleans Steamship Assn.,
supra, at 467. That, of eour~e, be~ tlw que::~tion: the arbitrator can
'tommand the Union rwL to ;;trike.

q
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I

the Soviet Union does not present a "labor dispute"). See
also N LRB v. International Longshoremen's Assn., ·332 F. 2d
992, 995-996 (CA4 1964) (politically-motivated ILA boycott
of all ships that were trading or had traded with Cuba is not
a. "labor dispute" within the meaning of § 2 (9) of the National Labor Relations Act).
The present cases plainly do not ill volve "labor disputes"
within the meaning of Norris- LaGuardia. ~ Although injunctions must reflect sensitivity to First and Thirteenth Amendment values/ the work stoppages at issue clearly do not
remotely warrant the additional protective umbrella of the
national labor policy.
Because both Courts of Appeals have, in my view, errone·
ously viewed a strike to achieve a E._Urely political goalhowever worthy-of the Union ·as a "labor dispute" protected
by Norris-LaGuardia, and because I do not believe in any
event that our decision in Buffalo Forge precludes anti-strike
injunctions in these cases, I would grant certiorari and sum~
marily reverse the judgments of the Courts of Appeals. Our
caseload problems cannot justify tolerance of such egregious
abuse of judicial power as manifest in these holdings.

6 Noting that none of the re~pondents wa~> enjoined from speaking and
that the injunctions prohibit only concerted work 8toppuges, the Fifth
Circuit rejected respondents' claims that the injunctions violated First and
Thirteenth Amendment rights. New Orleans Steamship Assn., supra, at

462-463,

(
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Re:
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No. 80-104S, Jacksonville Bulk TerminalsL
Inc. v. ILA
No. 80-10S8, Hampton Roads Shipping Assn
v. ILA

At Conference today, we voted to hear the
problem presented by these cases.
I intend to
vote to grant in the CAS case, Jacksonville Bulk
Terminals, and to hold the CA4 case, Hampton Roads
Shipping, for Jacksonville. The issues are more
fully ventilated in the CAS opinion. Judge
Sprouse's opinion for CA4 in Hampton Roads
Shipping does not discuss the Norris-LaGuardia
issue, although he impliedly decides the issue in
favor of the union.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-1777
Complete Auto Transit, Inc.,]
et al., Petitioners,
On ':'rit of Certiorari to the
Umted States Court of Apv. ·
peals for the Sixth Circuit.
. Danny Reis et al.
[May 4, 1981]
JusTICE PoWELL, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
The Court's opinion makes clear that Congress, in enacting
the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, did not intend to hold individuals liable in ~am
ages for wildcat strikes. I therefore join the Court's judgment and most of its opinion. I do not, however, share the
Court's view that there remains to management a "significant
array of other remedies," ante, at 15, n. 18, with which to
deter or obtain compensation for illegal strikes. In fact, the
"remedies" said to be available are largely chimerical.

I

Collective-bargaining agreements typically contain a promise by the union not to strike during the agreement's term.
Unions agree to these no-strike clauses in exchange for the
employer's promise to arbitrate disputes arising in contract
administration. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U. S. 448, 449, 455 (1957). Each promise is the "quid pro
quo" for the other, United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U. S. 564, 567 (1960), because the employer yields
traditional managerial autonomy in exchange for industrial
peace.
Despite the mutual benefits of the no-strike/grievance-arbitration pact, strikes in breach of contract occur with dis-

2
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turbing frequency. In some cases, these strikes are encouraged or even instigated by union leaders. 1 Often, however,
they are true "wildcats"-strikes that arise spontaneously to
protest grievances against the company and, occasionally,
against the union leadership itself. Responsible unions disapprove of such strikes, but some officials, especially those at
the local level, may acquiesce in them because of the fervor
of intransigent members.
Whatever the cause, strikes in breach of contract frequently
injure all concerned: the employer/ employees, and the public. Strikes and lockouts by their nature squander human working capacity, the full use of which is essential to
the enjoyment of the Nation's productive potential. To be
sure, the national labor policy recognizes that, in some circumstances, the use of weapons of strike and lockout is consistent with and protected by law. Labor, management, and
the public nevertheless share a "common goal of uninterrupted production." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 582 (1960). The essential tenet of
our labor policy is that "a system of industrial self-government" based on consensual (albeit vigorously negotiated)
labor contracts, see United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
1
Strike encouragement sometimes is explicit but more often is cryptic.
A union may employ subtle signals to convey the messa ge to strike. One
court noted that unions sometimes employ "a. nod or a wink or a
code ... in place of the word 'strike.'" United States v. UMW, 77 F.
Supp. 563, 566 (DC 1948), aff'd,- U.S. App. D. C.-, 177 F. 2d 29,
cert. demed, 338 U. S. 871 (1949).
2
Production disruptions have obvious short-term adverse consequences.
And one commentator has pointed out that the long-term consequences of
these strikes may be even more severe. A strike rends the "closely integrated supply and distribution systems" that the company has developed.
M. Jay Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions' Narrowing Path to Rectitude?, 50 Ind. L. J. 472, 473 (1975). Such systems "presume predictability. A business with a reputation for labor problems, let alone wildcats, simply cannot provide its customers with that predictability," ibid.,
leading once-regular customers to seek other sources of supply.

COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT, INC. v. REIS
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Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), is
preferable to "strikes, lockouts, or other self-help," Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U. S. 235, 249
(1970).
When the Taft-Hartley amendments were enacted in 1947,
the Nation had experienced a wave of labor unrest. 3 Congress found that "the balance of power in collective bargaining" had been destroyed because employers, who had promised to arbitrate disputes in exchange for no-strike promises,
often failed to obtain the industrial peace for which they
bargained. S. Rep., supra, n. 3, at 14."
II
It is increasingly clear that the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments did not provide employers with an effective remedy
for wildcat strikes. The Court today holds, properly I think,
that Congress intended to foreclose a damages remedy against
individual wildcat strikers. The Court states, however, that
there remains a number of legal weapons with which to deter
or terminate illegal strikes, or to obtain compensation when
they occur. Ante, at 15-16, n. 18. In support of its view,
the Court contends that the employer may (i) obtain an in3 The
Senate Report accompanying the Taft-Hartley amendments
observed that the Nation in 1945 experienced
"the loss of approximately 38,000,000 man-days of labor through strikes.
This total was trebled in 1946 when there were 116,000,000 man-days
lost . . . . " S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947) (hereinafter
S. Rep.).
• The Senate Report stated that if workers "can break agreements with
relative impunity, then such agreements do not tend to stablize industrial
relations. The execution of such an agreement does not by itself promote
industrial peace. The chief advantage which an employer can reasonably
expect from a collective labor agreement is assurance of uninterrupted
operation during the term of the agreement. Without some effective
method of assuring freedom from economic warfare for the term of the
agreement, there is little reason why an employer would desire to sign such
a contract." Id., at 16.

•;
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junction, (ii) discharge the strikers, (iii) request the union
to use its internal disciplinary powers, or (iv) sue the union
entity for damages. Ibid. In reality. more often than not,
each of these remedies is illusory.
Injunctions in labor disputes are generally prohibited by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 5 In Boys lvfarkets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), the Court recognized
a limited exception to the anti-injunction provisions of that
Act. Boys Markets permits injunctions to terminate strikes
pending arbitration if the grievance underlying the strike is
arbitrable. Hmvever, Boys Markets offers only "narrow"
relief, id., at 253, because injunctions cannot be obtained in
strikes of other kinds. E. g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976) (injunctions not available
in sympathy strikes). Moreover, even when an injunction
is available, workers on strike often are disinclined tO obey
it. 6 Courts may be reluctant to impose contempt penalties
on individual workers; if ordered, such penalties are difficult
to enforce.
Nor is discharge a realistic remedy in most cases. Because
a strike in breach of contract is unprotected conduct under
the National Labor Relations Act, see NLRB v. Sands Mfg.
Co., 306 U. S. 332 (1939), workers who strike illegally may
be terminated. It therefore has been argued that discharge
effectively deters strikes and punishes wrongdoers because
discharge is "the industrial equivalent of capital punishment." M. Jay Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Union's
5
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 104, provides, in
pertinent part:
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute. . .. "
° Compare Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 11,.87, UMW, 457 F. 2d 162
(CA7 1972) with Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local1l,B7, UMW, 500 F. 2d 950,
952 (CA7 1974). See Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitration:
Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 533, 541, and n. 47 (1978).

<I
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Narrowing Path to Rectitude?, 50 Ind. L. J. 472, 481 (1975).
There are at least three reasons why this remedy in practice
often is not effective. First, in a large wildcat strike, wholesale discharges are not practical because an employer cannot
terminate all or most of his labor force without crippling
production. See Boys Markets, 81tpra, at 248-249, n. 17. 7
Second, certain kinds of selective discharges arguably are
illegal. The National Labor Relations Board takes the position that an employer may not discipline a union officer more
severely than other strike particip~nts, even where the union
officer failed to fulfill a contractual undertaking to help terminate strikes. 8 In any event, discharging only selected
strikers is unlikely to influence the rank-and-file to return
to work. Such discharges actually may aggravate worker discontent and thereby prolong the strike. Cedar Coal Co., v.
UMW, 560 F. 2p 1153, 1157 (CA4 1977), cert. denied, 434
U. S. 1047 (1978); see 86 Harv. L. Rev. 447, 454, n. 33
(1972). At a minimum, strikers may insist that their discharged colleagues be reinstated as a condition to returning
to work. Fishman & Brown, Union Responsibility for Wild7 Discharging the entire work force would "caus[e] mountainous personnel problems. Consider the sheer logistics of hiring, training and acclimating an entirely new work force with suitable skil1s. Even if a
new labor force could be recruited, the time and expense of this process,
from recruitment to full promotion, could very well sound the death knell
of the business ." Fishman & Brown, Union Responsibility for Wildcat
Strikes, 21 Wayne L. Rev. 1017, 1021 (1975).
8 E. g., Miller Brewing Co., 254 N. L. R. B. No. 24 (Jan. 14, 1981);
South Central Bell Telephone Co., 254 N. L. R. B. No. 32 (Jan. 14, 1981);
Precision Casting Co., 233 N. L. R. B. 183 (1977). The Board's position
is so clear that employers may be deterred from conducting selective discharges. This Court has not addressed the question, but some courts of
appeals have not warmly received the Board's reasoning. See Gould, Inc.
v. NLRB, 612 F. 2d 728 (CA3 1979) (denying enforcement to 237
N. L. R. B. 881 (1978)), cert. denied, U. S. (1980); Indiana &
Mich. Electric Co. v. NLRB, 599 F. 2d 277 (CA7 1979) (denying enforcement to 237 N. L. R. B. 226 (1978)); see also NLRB v. Armour-Dial,
Inc., 638 F. 2d 51, 54-56 (CA8 1981).

) l'.·~
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cat Strikes, 21 Wayne L. Rev. 1017, 1022 (1975). Third,
arbitrators not infrequently refuse to sustain discharges of
strikers. See Handsaker & Handsaker, Remedies and Penalties for Wildcat Strikes: How Arbitrators and Federal
Courts Have Ruled, 22 Cath. U. L. Rev. 279, 284 (1973).
The union itself normally will not discipline its striking
members. Most unions have the legal authority to take such
action, see Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,
64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1065 (1951), but the power seldom
is used. In a wildcat strike, worker recalcitrance sometimes
is directed at the incumbent union leadership as much as at
company management. In these circumstances, the union's
attempt to discipline is unlikely to be effective and may be
counterproductive. Moreover, under this Court's decision in
Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U. S. 212 (1979), a parent
union normally is not obligated to take affirmative steps to
prevent or terminate a wildcat strike. Absent such an obligation, there is little incentive for the union to intervene, even
where intervention would be useful.
Finally, a suit for damages against the union entity rarely
is feasible. 9 Last Term, in Carbon Fuel, supra, we largely
9 Sophisticated employers for tactical reasons may elect to forego
tenable post-strike suits for damages. As the Court points out, such suits
may "exacerbate industrial strife," ante, at 15, n. 18, and thereby delay
the dissipation of the acrimony engendered by the strike. Employers also
may elect not to sue tor damages because they do not want to subject
themselves to the disclosure attendant to litigation. A damages suit
"necessarily involves detailed discussion of an employer's most intimate
financial secrets. By making a damage claim, the employer puts its
finances at issue in the litigation . The discovery rules of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure give the union and its accountants the right to
explore every corner of the employer's books. If the union conducts its
case properly, it will know everything from per-unit profit to the finer
details of corporate management." M. Jay Whitman, supra, n. 1, 50 Ind.
L. J., at 474 (footnote omitted).
Finally, part of the price of settling the strike often is a promise that the
company will waive its claim for damages. Ransdell v. Int ernational
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foreclosed this possibility when we held that liability normally may not be imposed on a parent union 10 absent proof
that it authorized or ratified the strike.11 It is a foolish
union that would invite a damages suit by explicitly endorsing a strike in this manner. See n. 1, supra.

III
The Court plainly is unrealistic, therefore, when it suggests
that employers have at their disposal a battery of alternate
remedies for illegal strikes. Ante, at 15, n. 18. The result
of the absence of remedies is a lawless vacuum. Despite a
no-strike clause, a plant may be closed with adverse consequences that often are far-reaching. The strike injures the
employer, other companies and their employees, and consumers in general. Frequently, the strike is harmful even·
to the majority of strikers, who feel obligated to honor the
picket line of minority wildcatters.
It is, of course, the province of Congress to set the Nation's
labor policy. I do not suggest that authorizing a damages
remedy against individual wildcat strikers would be desirable. I do believe, however, that the absence of an effective
remedy leaves such strikes undeterred and the public interest
unprotected. The National Labor Relations Act, as amended
in 1947, was intended to further broader national interests
Assn. of Machinists, 97 L. R. R. M. 2738 (ED Wis. 1978); Gould, On
Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Market Case, 1970
Sup. Ct. Rev. 215, 231 (1970).
1
° Carbon Fuel did not consider the quantum of proof necessary to
establish damages liability against a local union. Because of the local's
proximity to workers, an inference of agency-and hence, liabilityarguably may arise even without explicit proof of strike authorization or
ratification. See § 301 (e) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. § 185 (e). The possibility that the local will be liable may be of little practical benefit, however, because the local often is judgment-proof.
11 Carbon Fuel recognized, of course, that an explicit contractual undertaking by the parent to intervene to terminate wildcats could be the basis
for damages liability. See 444 U. S., at 218-222.
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than those of either labor or management. It was conceived
not only as a charter for labor rights but also as a framework
of law to promote orderly labor relations. Wildcat strikes
are at war with these objectives.
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Dear Chief:
Thurgood has agreed to do the opinion for the Court in
the above.

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
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RE:

80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminal v. International
Longshoremen's Association

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I am reexamining my position with respect to Buffalo Forqe .
There were several votes contingent on whether that case should
be overruled .
I will let you know .
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No. 80-1045, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
If Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397
(1976), can be read to prevent a fed~ral court from
enjoining a union from refusing to handle cargo to or from a
foreign country it does not approve of, in violation of the
no-strike clause in its contract, I would join to overrule
it.
Regards,
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One of "us irreconcilables " will be doing a
dissent in this case .
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Dear

Chief~

I would consider joining an opinion to overrule
Buffalo Forge.
It cut back substantially on Bov's Market, and
seems to me to be contrarv to national policy in favor of
arbitration.
As was evident from the briefing and argument of
this case, the rationale of Buffalo Forge is being read to
justify a strike for any political or policy cause wholly
unrelated to disputes between management and unions over the
terms and conditions of employment. Unlike the union
movement in some other countries, American unions only
rarely have authorized or tolerated strikes in the interest
of furthering a political cause, foreign or domestic.
The sanctioning of such strikes by this Court
could encourage a change in this policy of restraint by
unions.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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Dear Chief,
As I indicated at the Conference, I would
also consider joining an opinion to overrule
Buffalo Forge.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

~~ ~ -19

~~

JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS, INC. ET AL., PETITIONERS v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ~
ASSOCIATION ET AL.
~~ ~
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[March - , 1982]

LA-

~

~~

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. ~
~~
In this case, we consider the power of a federal court to
join a politically motivated work stoppage in an action ~ ':u-o-~
brought by an employer pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor ~ ~
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S. C. § 185(a) ~
(giving federal courts jurisdiction over breach-of-contract ac~
tions between an employer and a labor organization), to en- S-?<.- p 6-, 0
force a union's obligations under a collective-bargaining
agreement. We first address whether the broad anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C.
§ 101 et seq., apply to politically motivated work stoppages.
Finding these provisions applicable, we then consider
whether the work stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398
U. S. 235 (1970), and Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), pending an arbitrator's decision on
whether the strike violates the collective-bargaining
agreement.

J

en-~., 4

I
On January 4, 1980, President Carter announced that, due
to the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, certain
trade with the Soviet Union would be restricted.

,
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Superphosphoric acid (SPA), used in agricultural fertilizer,
was not included in the Presidential embargo. 1 On January 9,
1980, respondent International Longshoremen's Association
(ILA) announced that its members would not handle any
cargo bound to, or coming from, the Soviet Union or carried
on Russian ships. 2 In accordance with this resolution, respondent local union, an ILA affiliate, refused to load SPA
bound for the Soviet Union aboard three ships that arrived·at
the shipping terminal operated by petitioner Jacksonville
Bulk Terminals, Inc. (JBT) at the Port of Jacksonville, Florida during the month of January 1980.
'On February 25, 1980, the embargo was extended to include SPA along
with other products. On April24, 1981, President Reagan lifted the SPA
embargo as part of his decision to remove restrictions on the sale of grain
to the Soviets. By telegrams dated April 24, 1981 and June 5, 1981, the
ILA has recommended to its members that they resume handling goods to
and from the Soviet Union. Although the work stoppage is no longer in
effect, there remains a live controversy over whether the collective-bargaining agreement prohibits politically motivated work stoppages, and the
Union may resume such a work stoppage at any time. As a result, this
case is not moot. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S.
397, 403, n. 8 (1976).
2
The President of the ILA made the following announcement:
"In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of
the Union, the leadership of the ILA today ordered immediate suspension
in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to
Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed.
"The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international
events that have affected relations between the U. S. & Soviet Union.
"However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by
the demands of the workers.
"It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes
under present conditions of the world.
"People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy
as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a
decision in which the Union leadership concurs." Brief for Respondents 2,
n. 2 .

..,
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In response to this work stoppage, petitioners JBT,
Hooker Chemical Corporation, and Occidental Petroleum
Company (collectively referred to as the Employer)3 brought
this action pursuant to § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U. S. C.
§ 185(a), against respondents ILA, its affiliated local union,
and its officers and agents (collectively referred to as the
Union). The Employer alleged that the Union's work stoppage violated the collective-bargaining agreement between
the Union and JBT. The Employer sought to compel arbitration under the agreement, requested a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pending arbitration, and sought damages.
~
The agreement contains both a
ad no-strike claus nd a
a
provision requiring the resolution of a
grievance procedure, ending in arbitration. 4 The no-strike
clause provides:
"During the term of this Agreement, ... the Union
agrees there shall not be any strike of any kind or degree
whatsoever, ... for any cause whatsoever; such causes

dtspu~gh

3
JBT is a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxy Chemical Corporation, which
is a subsidiary of Hooker. Ownership of all these corporations is ultimately vested in Occidental. Hooker Chemical Company manufactures
SPA at a manufacturing facility in Florida. Pursuant to a bilateral trade
agreement between Occidental and the Soviet Union, SPA is shipped to
the Soviet Union from the JBT facility in Jacksonville.
' The grievance and arbitration clause provides in relevant part:
"Matters under dispute which cannot be promptly settled between the
Local and an individual Employer shall ... be referred . . . to a Port
Grievance Committee. . . . In the event this Port Grievance Committee
cannot reach an agreement . .. the dispute shall be referred to the Joint
Negotiating Committee .. . .

"A majority decision of this Committee shall be final and binding on both
parties and on all Employers signing this Agreement. In the event the
Committee is unable to reach a majority decision within 72 hours after
meeting to discuss the case, it shall employ a professional arbitrator .. .. "

I

80-1045-0PINION
4

JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS v. LONGSHOREMEN

including but not limited to, unfair labor practices by the
Employer or violation of this Agreement. The right of
employees not to cross a bona fide picket line is recognized by the Employer.... "
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida ordered the Union to process its grievance in accordance with the contractual grievance procedure. The District Court also granted the Employer's request for a preliminary injunction pending arbitration, reasoning that the
political motivation behind the work stoppage rendered the
Norris-LaGuardia
Act's
anti-injunction
provisions
inapplicable.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's order to the extent it required
arbitration of the question whether the work stoppage violated the collective-bargaining agreement. New Orleans
Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626
F. 2d 455 (1980). 5 However, the Court of Appeals disagreed
with the District Court's conclusion that the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act are inapplicable to politically motivated work stoppages. Relying on]luffalo Forge, the Court
of Appeals further held tnat tneEmployer was not entitled to
an injunction pending arbitration because the underlying dispute was not arbitrable. We agree with the Court0i"Appea1Sti'i'atthe-provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply
to this case, and that, under Buffalo Forge, an injunction
pending arbitration may ~
5
The Union concedes that the question whether the work stoppage violates the no-strike clause is arbitrable. In a consolidated case, the Court
of Appeals upheld an injunction issued by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana enforcing an arbitrator's decision that
the ILA work stoppage violated a collective-bargaining agreement. New
Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F. 2d
455, 469 (CA5 1980).
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II
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in part:
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute ... from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 104.

Congress adopted this broad prohibition to remedy the growing tendency of federal courts to enjoin strikes by narrowly
construing the Clayton Act's labor exemption from the Sherman Act's prohibition against conspiracies to restrain trade,
see 29 U.S. C. §52. See, e. g., H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 10-11 (1931). This Court has consistently given the anti-injunction provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act a broad interpretation, recognizing exceptions only in limited situations where necessary to
accommodate the Act to specific federal legislation or paramount congressional policy. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 249-253 (1970); Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 ~
u. s. 30, 39-42 (1957).
The Boys Markets exception, a refine in Bufj'alo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 . . 97 (1976), is re evant
to our decision today. In Boys Markets, this Court re-examined Sinclair Refining Co. v . Atkinson , 370 U. S. 195 (1962),
which held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes a federal
district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a collectivebargaining agreement, even where that agreement contains
provisions for binding arbitration of the grievance concerning
which the strike was called. 398 U. S., at 237-238. The
Court overruled Sinclair and held that, in order to accommo-

-
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date the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia to
the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) and the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration, it was essential to
recognize an exception to the anti-injunction provisions for
cases in which the employer sought to enforce the union's
contractual obligation to arbitrate grievances rather than to
strike over them. I d., at 249-253. 6
After Boys Markets, the Courts of Appeals divided on the
question whether a strike could be enjoined under the Boys
Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act pending arbitration, when the strike was not over a ·evance that the
union d alrreedto ar itrate. 7 In Buffalo Forge, the Court
reso ved this con c an eld that the Boys Markets exception does not apply when only the question whether the
strike violates the no-strike pledge, and not the dispute that
precipitated the strike, is arbitrable under the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. 8
The Employer argues that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does
not apply in this case because the political motivation underlying the Union's work stoppage removes this controversy
from that Act's definition of a "labor dispute." Alternatively, the Employer argues that this case fits within the exception to that Act recognized in Boys Markets as refined in
Buffalo Forge. We review these arguments in·turn.
6
In Boys Markets, the underlying dispute was clearly subject to the
grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective-bargaining agreement, and the strike clearly violated the no-strike clause.
7
See cases cited in Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 404, n. 9.
8
In Buffalo Forge, the strike at issue was a sympathy strike in support
of sister unions negotiating with the employer. The Court reasoned that
there was no need to accommodate the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to § 301 and the federal policy favoring arbitration when a strike is not
called over an arbitrable dispute, because such a strike does not directly
frustrate the arbitration process by denying or evading the union's promise
to arbitrate. 428 U. S., at 407-412.

80-1045-0PINION
JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS v. LONGSHOREMEN

7

III
At the outset, we must determine whether this is a "case
involving or growin~ispute" within the
meamng of § 4 of the oms- aGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C.
§ 104. Section 13(c) of the Act broadly defines the term labor dispute to include "any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 113(c). 9
The E~es that the existence of political motives takes this work stoppage controversy outside the broad
scope of this definition. This argument, however_. has no basis in the plain statutor Ian a e of the Norris-La uardia
Act or in our pnor interpretations of that Act. Furthermore, the argument is contradicted by the legislative history
of not only the Norris-LaGuardia Act but also the 1947 TaftHartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).
A
An action brought by an employer against the union representing its employees to enforce a no-strike pledge generally
involves two controversies. First, there is the "underlying
dispute," which is the event or condition that triggers the
work stoppage. This dispute may or may not be political,
and it may or may not' be arbitrable under the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. Second, there is the parties'
dispute over whether the no-strike pledge prohibits the work
stoppage at issue. This second dispute can always form the
basis for federal court jurisdiction, because § 301(a) gives fedSection 13(c) provides:
(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
9
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eral courts jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U. S. C.
§ 185(a).
It is beyond cavil that the second form of dis ute-whether
the coTiective-bargaining agreement either forbids or ermits
the union to refuse o pe orm certain work-is a "controversy cO'ii'Ce"'rning the terms or condfti();s of emloyment."
29U. K rr-§1T3"{c'):--Tll1s § 30factl0n was brought o resolve just such a controversy. In its complaint, the Employer did not seek to enjoin the intervention of the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan, nor did it ask the District Court to decide whether the Union was justified in expressing disapproval of the Soviet Union's actions. Instead, the Employer
sought to enjoin the Union's decision not to proViaeTaoor, a
decision w Icnt11e-EmpiOyerbeli ve~rms of
the collective-bargaining agreement. It is this contract dispute, and not the political dispute, that the arbitrator will reso!Ve~nd ~rts are a~
The plain language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not
except labor disputes having their genesis in political protests. Nor is there any basis in the statutory language for
the argument that the Act requires that each dispute relevant to the case be a labor dispute. The Act merely reJLuires
that the case..J!Ivolv!:., "any" labor di - ute. Therefore, the 1..4~~
plain terms of § 4(a) and § 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprive the federal courts of the power to enjoin the Union's ~~
work stoppage in this § 301 action, without regard to whether ~~
the Union also has a nonlabor dispute with another entity. 10

--

-:>\

-

~~·

10
Of course, there are exceptions to the Act's prohibitions against enjoining work stoppages. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). The employer may obtain an injunction to
enforce an arbitrator's decision that the strike violates the collective-bargaining agreement and can recover damages for the violation, pursuant to
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U. S. C. § 185.
See, e. g., Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 405. See also-, and note ti?infra (discussing Board's authority under 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1), to

1% J
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The conclusion that this case involves a labor dispute
within the meaning of the Norris- Guardia Act comports
with this Court's consistent interpretation of that Act. 11 Our
decisions have recognized that the term "labor dispute" must
not be narrowly construed because the statutory definition itself is extremely broad and because Congress deliberately included a broad definition to overrule judicial decisions that
had unduly restricted the Clayton Act's labor exemption from
the antitrust laws. For example, in Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U. S. 365, 369 (1960),
the Court observed:

a

petition for an injunction upon finding reasonable cause to believe that the
strike is an unfair labor practice).
11
The Employer's reliance on Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556
(1978), to argue that a politically motivated strike is not a labor dispute is
misplaced. In Eastex, we addressed whether certain concerted activity
was protected under § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 157, and we recognized that "[t]here may well be types of conduct or speech that are so
purely political or so remotely connected to the concerns of employees as
employees as to be beyond the protection of§ 7." !d., at 570, n. 20. Although the definition of a "labor dispute" in § 2(9) of the NLRA, 29
U. S. C. § 152(9), is virtually identical to that in § 13(c) of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 113(c), and the two provisions have been construed consistently with one another, e. g., United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U. S. 219, 234, n. 4 (1941), this similarity does not advance the Employer's argument. Union activity that prompts a "labor dispute" within
the meaning of these sections may be protected by§ 7, prohibited by§ 8(b),
29 U. S. C. § 158(b), or neither protected nor prohibited. The objective of
the concerted activity is relevant in determining whether such activity is
protected under§ 7 or prohibited by§ 8(b), but not in determining whether
the activity is a "labor dispute" under § 2(9).
Moreover, the conclusion that a purely political work stoppage is not protected under § 7 means simply that the employer is not prohibited by
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1), from discharging or disciplining employees for this activity. It hardly establishes that no "labor
dispute" existed within the meaning of§ 2(9). Similarly, if the employees
protested such sanctions under the collective-bargaining agreement, an arbitrator might ultimately conclude that the sanctions were proper, but this
would not alter the obvious fact that the matter is a labor dispute.
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"Th[e] Act's language is broad. The language is
broad because Congress was intent upon taking the federal courts out of the labor injunction business except in
the very limited circumstances left open for federal jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The history
and background that led Congress to take this view have
been adverted to in a number of prior opinions of this
Court in which we refused to give the Act narrow interpretations that would have restored many labor dispute
controversies to the courts." (emphasis added; footnote
omitted)
The critical element in determining whether the provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply is whether "the employeremployee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy."
Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton, 315 U. S.
143, 147 (1942). In this case, the ~er and the Union
representing its employees are the disputants;-ind their dispute concerns the interpretati~contract that defines their relationship. 12 Thus, the employer-employee relationship is the matrix of this controversy.
Nevertheless, the Employer argues that a "labor dispute"
exists only when the Union's action is taken in its own "economic self-interest." The Employer cites American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99 (1968), and Columbia River Packers Association, supra, for this proposition.
12
A labor dispute might be present under the facts of this case even in
the absence of the dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause. Regardless of the political nature of the Union's objections to handling Sovietbound cargo, these objections were expressed in a work stoppage by employees against their employer, which focused on particular work
assignments. Thus, apart from the collective-bargaining agreement, the
employer-employee relationship would be the matrix of the controversy.
We need not decide this question, however, because this case does involve
a dispute over the interpretation of the parties' collective-bargaining
agreement.

t ~~
.
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In these cases, however, the Court addressed the very different question whether the relevant parties were "labor"
groups involved in a labor dispute for the purpose of determining whether their actions were exempt from the antitrust
laws. 13 These cases do not hold that a union's noneconomic
motive inevitably takes the dispute out of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, but only that that protections of that Act do
not extend to labor organizations when they cease to act as
labor groups or when they enter into illegal combinations
with nonlabor groups in restraint of trade. 14 Here, there is no
question that the Union is a labor group, representing its
own interests in a dispute with the Employer over the employees' obligation to provide labor.
Even in cases where the disputants did not stand in the
relationship of employer and employee, this Court has held
that the existence of noneconomic motives does not make the
13
In American Federation of Musicians , the Court held that, although
orchestra leaders acted as independent contractors with respect to certain
"club-date" engagements, the union's involvement with the leaders was not
a combination with a nonlabor group in violation of the Sherman Act. In
finding that leaders were a "labor group," and a party to a labor dispute,
the Court relied on the "'presence of a job or wage competition or some
other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests between the union members and the independent contractors."' 391 U. S. ,
at 106 (quoting the opinion of the District Court). In Hinton, the Court
found that the union was merely an association of independent fish sellers
involved in a controversy with fish buyers over a contract for the sale of
fish; they were not employees of the buyers, nor did they seek to be. 315
U. S., at 147.
The Employer's reliance on Bakery Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333
U. S. 437 (1948), is similarly misplaced. In that case, the Court held only
that a controversy between two businessmen over delivery times or methods of payment does not become a labor dispute merely because a union
representative, with or without his employer's consent, sought to obtain
payment pursuant to a particular method. I d., at 443-444.
" The Employer's economic-motive analysis also leads to the untenable
result that strikes in protest of unreasonably unsafe conditions and some
sympathy strikes are not "labor disputes."

I
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Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable. For example, in New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552
(1938), this Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited an injunction against picketing by members of a civic
group, which was aimed at inducing a store to employ Negro
employees. In determining that the group and its members
were "persons interested in a labor dispute" within the meaning of § 13, the Court found it immaterial that the picketers,
who were neither union organizers nor store employees,
were not asserting economic interests commonly associated
with labor unions-e. g., terms and conditions of employment
in the narrower sense of wages, hours, unionization or betterment of working conditions. I d., at 560. Although the
lower courts found Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable because
the picketing was motivated by the group's "political" or "social" goals of improving the position of Negroes generally,
and not by the desire to improve specific conditions of employment, this Court reasoned: "The Act does not concern itself with the background or the motives of the dispute." 303
U. S., at 561.
j ~/-" ~

C)

B
·
~~ 711-v
The Employer's argument that the Union's mo~ation for~~
engaging in a work stoppage determines whether the NorrisLaGuardia Act applies is also contrary to the legislative history of that Act. The Act was enacted in response to federal
court intervention on behalf of employers through the use of
//~
injunctive powers against unions and other associations of
employees. This intervention had caused the feder~J judi"? f1._...()
ciary to fall intoaisrepute among large se ents of his N ation's~n.
ee generally S. ep. No. 163, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 8, 162-18 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4915 (1932) (remarks
_____,.
of Sen.
Wagner).
-----.
Apart from the procedural unfairness of many labor injunctions, one of the greatest evils associated with them was the

....
- - - ·-. ....

:r-""-· ~:-

"\.... ·
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use of tort-law doctrines, which often made the lawfulness of
a strike depend upon ~iews of social and economic
P,olicy. See, e. g., Cox,
enE P"roblems in the Law of
Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 24 7, 256
(1958). In debating the Act, its supporters repeatedly expressed disapproval of this Court's interpretations of the
Clayton Act's labor exemption-interpretations which permitted a federal judge to find the Act inapplicable based on
his or her appraisal of the "legitimacy" of the union's objectives. 15 See, e. g., 75 Gong. Rec. 4916 (1932) (remarks of Sen.
Wagner) (definition of labor dispute expanded to overrule
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921));
id., at 5487-5488 (remarks of Sen. Geller) (bill brought forth
to remedy decisions allowing injunction in Duplex and in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Association, 274 U. S. 37
(1927)). See also id., at 4686 (remarks of Sen. Hebert) (committee minority agreed that injunctions should not have issued in Bedford and Duplex). See generally H.R. Rep. No.
669, 72d Gong., 1st Sess. 8, 10-11 (1932). The legislative
history is re lete with criticisms of the ability of powerful
em~s to use ederal judges as "strike- reaking' agencies; by virtue of their almost unbridled "equitable discretion," federal judges could enter injunctions based on their
disapproval of the employees' objectives, or on the theory
that these objectives or actions, although lawful if pursued by
a single employee, became unlawful when pursued through
the "conspiracy" of concerted activity. See, e. g., 75 Gong.
Rec. 4928-4938 (1932); id., at 5466--5468; id., at 5478-5481;
id., at 5487-5490.
Furthermore, the question whether the Norris-LaGuardia
Act would apply to politically motivated strikes was brought
to the attention of the 72nd Congress when it passed the Act.
15
See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 468-469
(1921). See also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Association, 274
u. s. 37, 54-55 (1927).

7
I
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Opponents criticized the definition of "labor dispute" in
§ 13(c) on the ground that it would cover politically motivated
strikes. Representative Beck argued that federal courts
should have jurisdiction to enjoin political strikes like those
threatened by labor unions in Europe. 75 Cong. Rec.
5471-5473 (19.32) (discussing threatened strike by British
unions protesting the cancellation of leases held by Communist Party members, and threatened strikes by Belgian
unions protesting a decision to supply military aid to Poland). 16 In response, Representative Oliver argued that the
federal courts should not have the power to enjoin such
strikes. ld., at 5480-5481. Finally, Representative Beck
offered an amendment to the Act that would have permitted
federal courts to enjoin strikes called for ulterior purposes,
including political motives. This amendment was defeated
soundly. See id., at 5507.
Further support for our conclusion that Congress believed
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to work stoppages instituted for political reasons can be found in the legislative
history of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA.
That history reveals that Congress rejected a proposal to ~e
peal theN'orris-LaGuardia Act with respect to one broad cat----n-~-----egory
of political strikes. 17 The House bill included definitions

---

-

The thrust of this objection was "that it takes no account whatever of
the motives and purposes with which a nation-wide strike or boycott can be
commenced and prosecuted." 75 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1932) (remarks of Rep.
Beck).
17
In relying on this history, we do not argue that congressional rejection
of a broad repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes accommodation of
that Act to the LMRA. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S.
195, 204-210 (1962). In Boys Markets Co. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398
U. S. 235, 249 (1970), this Court put that argument to rest. Rather, we
rely on this legislative history because it demonstrates that Congress believed that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply to controversies concerning
politically motivated work stoppages. Furthermore, in this case, unlike
Boys Markets, we are not asked to accommodate the Norris-LaGuardia
'

6
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of various kinds of labor disputes. See H.R. 3020, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Legislative History of the LMRA 158
(1947) (Leg. His.); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Con., 1st Sess.,
18--19, 1 Leg. His. 292, 309-310. Of relevance here, § 2(13)
defined a "sympathy" strike as a strike "called or conducted
not by reason of any dispute between the employer and the
employees on strike or participating in such concerted interference, but rather by reason of either (A) a dispute involving
another employer or other employees of the same employer,
or (B) disagreement with some governmental policy." H.R.
3020, § 2(13), 1 Leg. His. 168 (emphasis added). Section 12
of the House bill made this kind of strike "unlawful concerted
activity," and "it remove[d] the immunities that the present
laws confer upon persons who engage in them." H.R. Rep.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 1 Leg. His. 314. In particular, the Norris-LaGuardia Act would not apply to suits
brought by private parties to enjoin such activity, and damages could be recovered. See id., at 23-24, 43-44, 1 Leg.
His. 314-315, 334-335. In explaining these provisions, the
House Report stated that strikes "against a policy of national
or local government, which the employer cannot change,"
should be made unlawful, and that "[t]he bill makes inapplicable in such suits the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which heretofore
has protected parties to industrial strife from the consequences of their lawlessness." I d., at 24, 44, 1 Leg. His.
315, 335.
The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version,
which had eliminated these provisions of the House bill. 18
Act to a specific federal act or to the strong policy favoring arbitration.
8
' The Senate had declined to adopt these provisions of the House bill.
The Senate Report explained that it did not want to impair labor's social
gains under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA of 1935, but instead
wanted to remedy "specific types of injustice" or "clear inequities" by "precise and carefully drawn legislation." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 1 Leg. His. 407. Some of the concerted activities listed in § 12 of
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The Conference Report explained that its recommendation
did not go as far as the House bill, that § 8(b) prohibits jurisdictional strikes and illegal secondary boycotts, and that the
Board, not private parties, may petition a district court
under § lO(k) or § 10(1) to enjoin these activities notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 510, 80th Gong. 1st Sess. 36, 42-43, 57, 58-59, 1
Leg. His. 540, 546-547, 561, 562--563. In short, Congress
declined in 1947 to adopt a broad "political motivation" exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act for strikes in protest of
some governmental policy. Instead, if a strike of this nature
takes the form of a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8(b),
Congress chose to give the Board, not private parties, the
power to petition a federal district court for an injunction.
See 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1).

c
This case, brought by the Employer to enforce its collective: bargaining agreement with the Union, involves a "labor
dispute" within any common-sense meaning of that term.
w ere we to ignore this plam interpretation and hold that the
political motivation underlying the work stoppage removes
this controversy from the prohibitions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, we would embroil federal judges in the very
scrutin of "legitimate objectives" that Con ess intended to
preyent..lYhen it passe t at Act. T e applicability not only
of § 4, but of all of the procedural protections embodied in
that Act, would turn on a single federal judge's perception of
the motivation underlying the concerted activity. 19 The Emthe House bill were made unfair labor practices, and the National Labor
Relations Board, not private parties, could petition a district court for injunctions against certain unfair labor practices. See id., at 35, 40, 1 Leg.
His. 441, 446 (reciting proposed revisions to NLRA, §§ 8(b), lO(k), 10(1)).
19
This proposed exception does not limit the judge's discretion to consideration of specified external conduct or of provisions in a collective-bargaining agreement, as does the Boys Markets exception. It provides no

.,,
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ployer's interpretation is simply inconsistent with the need,
expressed by Congress when it enacted the NorrisLaGuardia Act, for clear "mileposts for judges to follow." 75
Cong. Rec. 4935 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bratton).
In e~ce, the Employer asks us to disr~ard the l~sla
tive history of the .Act and to aistort the definition of a labor
~e in oroer to reach what it believes to be an "equitable"
result. The Employer's real complaint, however, is not with
the Union's po 1tlca o Jec wns to the conduct of the Soviet
Union, but with what the Employer views as the Union's
br>ach of co:Q.tract. ""'fiieEfuployer's frUstration with this alleged breach of contract should not be remedied by characterizing it as other than a labor dispute. We will not adopt
by judicial fiat an interpretation that Congress specifically rejected when it enacted the Taft-Hartley amendments to the
NLRA. See note 17, supra. In the past, we have consistently declined to constrict Norris-LaGuardia's broad prohibitions except in narrowly defined situations where accommodation of that Act to specific congressional policy is
necessary. We refuse to deviate from that path today.
IV

Alternatively, the Employer argues tha.t the Union's work
guidance to judges in dealing with concerted activity arguably designed to
achieve both political and labor-related goals. Such mixed-motivation
cases are bound to arise. For example, in United States Steel Corp. v.
United Mine Workers, 519 F. 2d 1236 (CA5 1975), miners picketed another
employer for importing coal from South Africa. The Court of Appeals
held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied, and that the Boys Markets exception was not available, because "the miners' action was not aimed at
[their employer] at all, but rather at the national policy of this country's
permitting the importation of South African coal." 519 F. 2d, at 1247
(footnote omitted). Under the political-motivation exception, even if the
miners had picketed because slave labor was employed to mine the imported coal, the Norris-LaGuardia Act might not apply. Minor variations
in the facts would endow the courts with, or divest them of, jurisdiction to
issue an injunction, and would create difficult line-drawing problems.

'

•
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stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), and
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397
(1976), because the dispute underlying the work stoppage is
arbitrable under the collective-bargaining agreement. In
making this argument, the Employer disavows its earlier argument that the underlying dispute is purely political, and
asserts that the Union's work stoppage was motivated by a
disagreement with the Employer over the managementrights clause in the collective-bargaining agreement. The
Solicitor General, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the
United States, agrees with the Employer that the work stoppage may be enjoined pending arbitration. He contends that
in addition to the political dispute, disputes concerning both
the management-rights clause and the work-conditions clause
underlie the work stoppage, and that at least one of these disputes is arguably arbitrable. 20
We disagree. Buffalo Forge makes it clear that a Boys
Markets injunction pen ing arbitration shou not Issue unlessthe disputeUJioerlymg the work st;;pPage is arbitrable.
u alo orge compels the conclusion that
The ra 10n e
The management-rights clause provides:
"The Management of the Employer's business and the direction of the
work force in the operation of the business are exclusively vested in the
Employer as functions of Management. Except as specifically provided in
the Agreement, all of the rights, powers, and authority Employer had
prior to signing of this Agreement are retained by the Employer."
The work-conditions clause provides:
"Where hardship is claimed by the Union because of unreasonable or
burdensome conditions or where work methods or operations materially
change in the future, the problem shall first be discussed between the local
and Management involved. In the event an agrement cannot be reached,
either party may refer the dispute to the Joint Negotiating Committee
and, if the matter cannot be resolved by that Committee, either party may
then refer the questin to an arbitrator in accordance with the procedure set
forth in Clause 15(B)."
20

•'
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the Union's work stoppage, called to protest the invasion of
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, may not be enjoined pending the arbitrator's decision on whether the work stoppage
violates the no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining
agreement. The underlying dispute, whether viewed as an
expression of the Union's "moral outrage" at Soviet military
policy or as an expression of sympathy for the people of Afghanistan, is plainly not arbitrable under the collective-bargaining agreement.
The attempts by the Solicitor General and the Employer to
characterize the underlying dispute as arbitrable do not withstand analysis. The "underlying" disputes concerning the
management-rights clause or the work-conditions clause simply did not trigger the work stoppage. To the contrary, the
applicability of these clauses to the dispute, if any, was triggered by the work stoppage itself.
Consideration of
whether the strike intruded on the management-rights clause
or was permitted by the work-conditions clause may inform
the arbitrator's ultimate decision on whether the strike violates the no-strike clause. Indeed, the question whether
striking over a nonarbitrable issue violates other provisions
of the collective-bargaining agreement may itself be an arbitrable dispute. The fact remains, however, that the strike
itself was not over an arbitrable dispute and therefore may
not be enjoined pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality
of the strike under the collective-bargaining agreement.
The weaknesses in the analysis of the Employer and the
Solicitor General can perhaps best be demonstrated by applying it to a pure sympathy strike, which clearly cannot be enjoined pending arbitration under the rationale of Buffalo
Forge. If this work stoppage were a pure sympathy strike,
it could be characterized alternatively as a dispute over the
Employer's right to choose to do business with the employer
embroiled in a dispute with a sister union, as a dispute over
management's right to assign and direct work, or as a dispute
over whether requiring the union to handle goods of the em-
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ployer whose employees are on strike is an unreasonable
work condition. 21 None of these characterizations, however,
alter the fact, essential to the rationale of Buffalo Forge, that
the strike was not over an arbitrable issue and therefore did
not directly frustrate the arbitration process.
The Employer's argument that this work stoppage may be
enjoined pending arbitration really reflects a fundamental
disagreement with the rationale of Buffalo Forge, and not a
belief that this rationale permits an injunction in this case.
The Employer apparently disagrees with the Buffalo Forge
Court's conclusion that, in agreeing to broad arbitration and
no-strike clauses, the parties do not bargain for injunctive relief to restore the status quo pending the arbitrator's decision
on the legality of the strike under the collective-bargaining
agreement, without regard to what triggered the strike. Instead, they bargain only for specific enforcement of the
union's promise to arbitrate the underlying grievance before
resorting to a strike. See 428 U. S., at 410-412. The Employer also apparently believes that Buffalo Forge frustrates
the arbitration process and encourages industrial strife. But
see id., at 412. 22 However, this disagreement with Buffalo
2
In
' In fact, the employer in Buffalo Forge made just such a claim.
addition to alleging breach of the no-strike clause, it claimed that the strike
was caused by "refusal to follow a supervisor's instructions to cross the ...
picket line." Buffalo Forge, supra, at 401. The district court found that
the strike was in sympathy with the sister union and was not over a dispute
that the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. !d., at 40~03.
On appeal, the employer did not press its argument that the work stoppage
was in part a protest over truck driving assignments. !d., at 403, n. 8.
22
The Employer argues that industrial strife is encouraged because employers are given the incentive to discharge or discipline the workers for
refusing to work, which is likely to precipitate further strikes. According
to this argument, the strike, which began over a nonarbitrable dispute, is
transformed into a dispute over an arbitrable issue, i. e. the employer's
right under the collective-bargaining agreement to discipline these workers, and may be enjoined under the Boys Markets/Buffalo Forge exception. See, e. g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F. 2d 1110,
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Forge only argues for reconsidering that decision. 23 It does
not justify distorting the rationale of that case beyond recognition in order to reach the result urged by the Employer.

v
In conclusion, we hold that an employer's § 301 action to
enforce the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement
allegedly violated by a union's work stoppage involves a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, without regard to the motivation underlying the union's
decision not to provide labor. Under our decisions in Boys
Markets and Buffalo Forge, when the underlying dispute is
not arbitrable, the employer may not obtain injunctive relief
pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality of the strike
under the collective-bargaining agreement.
Affirmed.

1113-1114 (CA6 1980), affd on other grounds 451 U. S. 401 (1981). This
Court has not addressed the validity of this "transformation" analysis.
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S., at 405, n. 4.
23
The Employer has also requested that we reconsider our decision in
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976). We decline this invitation.
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CHAMBERS OF

··

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 17, 1982

Re :

No . 81-406 - Mississippi University for Women, et al .
v . Joe Hogan

MEMORANDUM TO :
FROM :

Al Stevas

The Chief Justice

/

~(.<

r:?

~ ~

I agree with your treatment but not the terminology .
I have thought in such a case you treat the " unruly "
paper as " lodged " but not " filed ."
We can let the matter stand where it
argument .

"'

cc:

The Conference

lS

unt il

March 17, 1982

80-1045

Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Longshoremen

Dear Thurgood:
Your opinion persuasively argues that the dispute in
this case was a "labor dispute" involving a central piece of
the collective bargai.ning agreement. You also demonstrate
the ease with which a sympathy or political strike can be
viewed as a strike over the terms of employment. For both
of these reasons I have always been puzzled by the step away
from Roy's Market the ~ourt took in Buffalo Forge.
For the time being I will await the dissent. But
I would join your opinion if you would add a final section
overrulinq Ruffalo Forge.
Sincerely,

..

'

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
LFP/vde

.

'

'

.'·

··'..

'·,

,,

..

~
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dfl 03/17/82

To:

Justice Powell

From:
Re:

David
Justice Marshall's draft opinion in Jacksonville Bulk
Terminals:

No. 80-1045.

I had a brief discussion with Justice Marshall's
clerk the other day about this case--primarily to make sure that our
opinion

in Allied would

not conflict

in any way.

As

potential conflict is concerned, I do not see any.

far

as

any

You might note

the legislative history discussion at page 15 with some extra care.
It can be argued that because the House's definition of "sympathy
strike"--to

include

strikes

against

governmental

policy--was

not

accepted by the Senate, therefore the Congress did not wish to make
political
called

strikes and

this

boycotts

illegal.

to my attention last week.

Justice Marshall's clerk
It seems to me,

however,

that it can just as easily be argued that the Senate assumed that
its

very broad definition of secondary boycott--a definition much

broader
political

than

the

boycotts

House's--took

up

the

of

At

any

neutrals.

slack
rate

and

very

would
little

cover
can

be

devined from the Senate's refusal to adopt the broader definition of
sympathy strike for our purposes in Allied, and I did not and do not
see the need of saying anything
legislative history.

in our opinion about this bit of

{It was not argued by the parties.)

2.

More

importantly,

Justice Marshall 1 s

clerk

told

me that he would be willing to overrule Buffalo Forge and that it is
their understanding that Justice Brennan would go along.

But he did

not wish to jeopardize his court by trying to do so in this draft.

I wonder if it would not make sense for you very
quickly to circulate something like the following--assuming that you
still favor overruling Buffalo Forge:

"Dear Justice Marshall:

Your opinion persuasively argues that the dispute
in this case was a "labor dispute" involving a central piece of the
collective bargaining agreement.

You also demonstrate the ease with

which a sympathy or political strike can
over

the

always

terms

been

of

employment.

~y

For

~

both of

be viewed as a strike
these

reasons

I

have

the step away from Boy 1 s Market the Court

took in Buffalo Forge.

For the time being I will await the dissent.
I

b~-t.ha.t

:f' would

But

join your opinion if you would add a final

section overruling Buffalo Forge.

.:§up-rnnt ~onrl cf t4t ~lt ~faits
~a.sfringiltn, ~.

<.g.

2Vgt'~.;l

CHAMBERS O F

T H E CH I E F .J UST I C E

/

March 1 7, 1982

Re :

No . 80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminals
v. Longshoremen

Dear Thurgood :
Unlike Lewis ' " tentative " position I cannot
agree that a boycott of Soviet shipping is a ~ labor
dispute~ between the ship owner and l9ngshoremen .
It is purely a political dispute - - and on which I
agree with the longshoreme n, but that- is not the issue .
.I

I am prepared to overrule Buffalo Forge b u t I 'd
like to do it some other way than calling a political
boycott a " labor dispute ."

1

Justice Marshall

. - ·:...

Copies to the Conference

..'

..'
.

-1 1 ,

•...:

.....

.'

'. ·:'

1

'
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CHAMBERS OF

March 18, 1982

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

/

No. 80-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Longshoremen

Dear Thurgood:
You•11 recall at conference that my view was that
this case had to be affirmed unless we were to overrule
Buffalo Forge. I gather that•s the basis upon which
you•ve written it and as long as Buffalo Forge stands
undisturbed 1 11 join it.
1

Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

~u:punu C!J:aurlaf tltt ~ttittlt .;§fattg
~as-lfin.g-htn. ~. C!j:. 2UgtJ!. ~
CHAMBERS OF

j

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 18, 1982

Re:

80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v.
International Longshoremen's Association

Dear Thurgood:
Although I think that your analysis of the Buffalo
Forge issue in Part IV of your opinion is correct, I am
still not persuaded that this case involves ~labor
dispute~~e-a~e~rr1s-LaGuaidia

A~~

As your opinion points out, that term is defined
by §13(c) as a controversy "concerning terms or
conditions of employment."
In my opinion, a
controversy concerning the question whether
superphosphoric acid shall be shipped to the Soviet
Union before it withdraws its armed forces from
Afghanistan is not such a controversy.
I also do not
agree with the notion that the litigation in which the
company seeks to enjoin the strike is the kind of
"labor dispute" that the anti-injunction provision of
the statute contemplated.
If that had been Congress'
intent, I would think the statute would simply have
prohibited all federal injunctions against strikes,
rather than injunctions against strikes growing out of
disutes over terms and conditions of employment.
I
shall therefore wait for further writing.

I

Respectfully,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

J

l(_

~uvumt
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

March 18, 1982

No. 81-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v.
Internatinal Longshoremen's Association

Dear Thurgood,
You have written persuasively concerning whether
the politically motivated wor k stoppage in this case is a
labor dispute within the meaning of the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. As I indicated at
. Conference, I could join an opinion overruling Buffalo
/ Forge. For the present, I shall await further writing.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall

Copies to the Conference

.....

~

.$$n.punu (!Jomi of tltt %tilih ;§taftg
~ngfri:ng-Urn.. ~.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

March 18, 1982

Re:

No. 80-1045

~

Jacksonville Bulk Terminals
v. International Longshoreman's Assn.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I will have a dissent around in this case next week .
Regards ,

,§u:pumr

/
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CHAMBERS OF

JUS TI CE B YRoN R

March 18, 1982

WHITE

Re:

80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminals
v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n

Dear Thurgood,
Please join me in your circulating draft.
Although it is
arguable that the No rris-LaGuardia Act was not intended to
foreclose injunctio n s in disputes like this, it se e ms to .me that
you have the bet ter of the argument.
With r e s p e ct t o re considering Buffalo Forge, I have b e en
strongly opp osed t o t he notion that the dissenting Justices in a
particular case s h ould feel free to consider overruling that case
as soon as a new Justice with similar views arrives on the scene
or as soon as one of the majority is willing to join them.
If
that were the u s ual policy, the law would be in a shambles and
the Court's authority severely diminished.
When a case has
r~ceived the kind of institutional attention that cases get here,
the resulting decision has an authority of its own that should
command more re s pect than the views of individual Justices.
At
least there should be some sound reason for overruling, such as
experience over a period of time.
The continued disagreement of
those who were in dissent seems to me an unwise predicate for the
Court to reverse its course.
This is particularly true in
statutory construction cases, where Congress is free to remedy
what it deems to be improvident interpretations of its laws.
If this is the kind of dispute within the reach of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, as I think it is, reversal of the decision
below would
be
little more
than a di s agreement with the
Congressional policy expre s sed in that legislation. That is not
a legitimate function for us, however.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conf e rence
cpm
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 19, 1982

RE: No. 80-1045, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals
v. International Longshoremen's Association

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I indicated earlier that I could, if necessary,
overrule Buffalo Forge, but it is now clear to me that we
need not reach that issue to reverse in this case.
This case does not involve or grow out of a labor
dispute as that term is defined in§ 13(c) of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 29 u.s.c. § ll3(c) (1976), or as that term
is commonly understood. Section 13(c) defines a labor
dispute as "any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment . . . . " The dispute in this case is strictly
a political dispute, not a controversy concerning "terms"
or "conditions" of employment. If a boycott of shipments
to or from the Soviet Union is a labor dispute, then every
challenge of a union or its members to a government policy
or program can be distorted into a labor dispute. If
Congress had intended to bar federal courts from issuing
injunctions in political disputes, it could have simply
prohibited federal courts from enjoining strikes rather
than limiting its prohibition to controversies concerning
"terms or conditions of employment." Therefore, I cannot
agree with the Court's conclusion that the NorrisLaGuardia Act bars a federal court from enjoining this
politically motivated boycott manifested in a work
stoppage.
The International Longshoremen's Association objects
to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. So do I
and millions of others. I can and do refuse to buy
Russian products, such as Stolnichnaya vodka. The union
can do the same, but here it announced that it would not

- 2 -

handle any cargo bound to, or coming from, the Soviet
Union, or any cargo carried on Russian ships. This case
commenced after the ILA refused to load superphosphoric
acid onto certain ships bound for the Soviet Union in
accordance with its oppostion to Soviet policy. The ILA
has no objection to any terms or conditions of employment
or any other quarrel with employers; it would have loaded
the superphosphoric acid on any non-Russian ship bound for
a destination other than the Soviet Union. No one has
suggested that the ILA's action is actually motivated to
obtain concessions relating in any way to employment
conditions. The ILA refused to handle the cargo simply
because a foreign country brutally invaded another country
and the union desired to express its opposition to the
invasion.
The plain words and plain meaning of§ 13(c) simply
cannot be read to lead to the conclusion that this case
involves or grows out of a labor dispute; the ILA members
are not seeking to make any changes in the terms or
conditions of their employment.
As the Court recognizes, we have held that the test
of whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies is whether
"the employer-employee ·relationship [is] the matrix of the
controversy." Columbia River Packers Association v.
Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1947). The courts of appeals
have held that unions are protected by the NorrisLaGuardia Act when they act to advance the economic
interests of their members. See, e.g., Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company,
362 F.2d 649, 654 (CAS 1966). These cases illustrate the
plain meaning of § 13(c) 's definition of labor dispute-the Norris-LaGuardia Act protects union organizational
efforts and efforts to improve working conditions. The
Court errs in finding that the matrix of this controversy
is the ILA's relationship with the petitioners. The
matrix of this controversy is the ILA's objection to the
Soviet invasion. The ILA's dispute with the petitioners
merely flows from the particular manner it employed to
show its opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan. The
ILA is neither directly -nor indirectly working to advance
the economic interests of its members, or even the
economic interests of Soviet or Afghan workers. In
reality, the ILA's conduct was patently contrary to its
members' economic interests since it reduces the amount of
available work and pay. Thus, the cases generally
explicating the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
support the conclusion reached from analysis of the plain
words of§ 13(c): This case simply does not involve or
grow out of a labor dispute.
Federal courts have consistently recognized that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply to politically

...

,·

'·
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motivated work stoppages concerning subjects over which
employers have no control. These courts, in cases which
are practically indistinguishable from this case, and in
fact often involved the same union, properly concluded
that the Act only applies to disputes concerning terms or
conditions of employment. 1
This Court has never before
intimated, as it now proposes to hold, that the NorrisLaGuardia Act protects the violation of no-strike clauses
simply because the union has a political view it wishes to
dramatize. Norris-LaGuardia is not concerned with
political disputes but only with labor disputes.
Since the meaning of the words of the statute is
plain, and since the applicable precedent supports the
conclusion that this is not a labor dispute, I cannot
justify a holding that politically motivated strikes are
outside the coverage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act absent
clear evidence to the contrary in the legislative history.
See, e.g., Bread Political Action Committee v. Federal
Election Commission, 50 U.S.L.W. 4291, 4292 (1982}. The
excerpts from the legislative history relied upon by the
Court fall far short of the clear evidence required to
overcome the plain language of§ 13(c). Frankfurter and
others cautioned that when the legislative history is
ambiguous, as it is here, we must follow the words of the
statute.
In 1947, Congress declined to amend the federal labor
laws so that strikes protesting "disagreement with some
government policy" would not be protected by the NorrisLaGuardia Act. I Legislative History of the LMRA 168
(1947}. Similarly, Congress in 1932 rejected an amendment
which would have permitted federal courts to enjoin acts
1 see Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers
International Union, 278 F.2d 49, 50-51 (CA2 1960}
(politically motivated blacklist of Egyptian ships to
retaliate for Egyptian blacklist of American ships that
dealt with Israel is not "labor dispute" triggering
Norris-LaGuardia}; West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 372 (SD
Tex. 1975}, aff'd summarily, 531 F.2d 574 (CAS 1976}
(union's refusal, on political grounds, in violation of a
no-strike agreement, to load grain on a ship bound for the
Soviet Union does not present a "labor dispute"). See
also NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d
992, 995-96 (CA4 1964} (politically motivated ILA boycott
of all ships that were trading or had traded with Cuba is
not a "labor dispute" within the meaning of § 2{9} of the
National Labor Relations Act).

"performed or threatened for an unlawful purpose or with
an unlawful intent . • • . " 75 Cong. Rec. 5507 (1932).
These amendments would have swept more broadly than the
plain language of§ 13(c) as it stands. Indeed,
Representative Beck's amendment would have rendered the
Norris-LaGuardia Act a nullity, since federal judges would
have been able to enjoin a strike merely by finding it
motivated by an "unlawful purpose." Congress might have
declined to adopt such amendments because they would have
rendered legitimate union activity unprotected.
Therefore, the legislative history does not compel a
conclusion in this case contrary to the plain language of
§ 13(c).
Finally, the Court argues that a common-sense
interpretation of the meaning of the term labor dispute
supports its conclusion. Even assuming that the "commonsense" meaning of the term labor dispute is relevant in
light of Congress' definition in§ 13(c), it does not
support the proposed opinion. The ILA objects to the
Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, but it has no
quarrel with petitioners. There is nothing to suggest
that anything the petitioners could have done to improve
the teLms or conditions of employment would have persuaded
the ILA to load the ships. Thus, common sense, as well as
the plain meaning of § 13(c), precludes a rational
conclusion that this dispute is a labor dispute.
Regards,

.··
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April 2, 1982

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v.
International Longshoremen's Association

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me. With all the correspondence that has
flowed back and forth for this case, I shall not burden us
all with comments on my part.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference
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CHAMB E RS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 16, 1982
RE: No. 80-1045, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
We seem to have reached an impasse in this case. A
majority seems inclined to reverse, but, apparently because
of our differing stands on how best to deal with the case,
the recorded vote at conference, 5-4 to affirm, left some
things "in the air."
As I read the various circulations, (a) John and I see
this as a purely political dispute and we would reverse
without reaching the Buffalo Forge issue; (b) Bill Brennan,
Thurgood, Lewis, and Sandra all think Buffalo Forge should
be reached; all but Thurgood are on record~ being willing
to reverse Buffalo Forge, and Thurgood dissented in Buffalo
Forge; (c) Byron and Harry have joined Thurgood's opinion;
Byron is on record as opposing overruling Buffalo Forge; and
(d) Bill Rehnquist hasn't voted.
To break this impasse, I now inquire whether Thurgood
might be willing to reconsider Buffalo Forge. Should he so
decide, we would need to add a new section to the opinion
dealing with Buffalo Forge.
I will join it, even though I
think Buffalo Forge need not be overruled to reverse in this
case.
If I am correct in my "scoresheet," it is possible that
a majority of the Court will go along. That, of course,
remains to be seen and will emerge when you respond.
If a majority believes that a strike protesting the
invasion of a foreign country may be enjoined, we ought, I
submit, so hold. To accomplish that, I am now prepared to
join an opinion reversing this case which modifies or
overrules Buffalo Forge.
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CHAMB E RS OF'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 16, 1982
RE: No. 80-1045, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
We seem to have reached an impasse in this case. A
majority seems inclined to reverse, but, apparently because
of our differing stands on how best to deal with the case,
the recorded vote at conference, 5-4 to affirm, left some
things "in the air."
As I read the various circulations, (a} John and I see
this as a purely political dispute and we would reverse
without reaching the Buffalo Forge issue; (b) Bill Brennan,
Thurgood, Lewis, and Sandra all think Buffalo Forge should
be reached; all but Thurgood are on record as being willing
to reverse Buffalo Forge, and Thurgood dissented in Buffalo
Forge; (c) Byron and Harry have joined Thurgood's opinion;
Byron is on record as opposing overruling Buffalo Forge; and
(d) Bill Rehnquist hasn't voted.
To break this impasse, I now inquire whether Thurgood
might be willing to reconsider Buffalo Forge. Should he so
decide, we would need to add a new section to the opinion
dealing with Buffalo Forge.
I will join it, even though I
think Buffalo Forge need not be overruled to reverse in this
case.
If I am correct in my "scoresheet," it is possible that
a majority of the Court will go along. That, of course,
remains to be seen and will emerge when you respond.
If a majority believes that a strike protesting the
invasion of a foreign country may be enjoined, we ought, I
submit, so hold. To accomplish that, I am now prepared to
join an opinion reversing this case which modifies or
overrules Buffalo Forge .
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 19, 1982
Re:

No. 80-1045

Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA

Dear Chief:
I have read your memorandum to the Conference dated
April 16th, addressing the various possibilities for a
decision in this case. I voted at Conference to affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and continue to be of the
view that Buffalo Forge should not be overruled. Because
the question of whether or not this was a "labor dispute"
seemed to me closer than I had thought, I was awaiting the
further circulation of your dissent before finally casting
my vote. But since I definitely do not favor overruling
Buffalo For~e, which you now suggest~ will vote now to
make my pos1tion clear.

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 19, 1982
Re:

No. 80-1045

Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

tvM
Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

~
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Re:

AprJ ,

1982

CHAMBE:RS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

No. 80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA

Dear Chief:
This is in response to your inquiry of April 16.
I
have no inclination in this case to overrule Buffalo Forge.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

.:§uprtmt <qourt of tltt ~trittb .:§taf.ta
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re:

April 19, 1982

No. 80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA

Dear Chief:
not

In reply to your inquiry of April 16, I will
write or vote to overrule Buffalo Forge.
Sincerely,

T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

~uvrtmt
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CHAMBERS CJr

-

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

April 19, 1982

No. 80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. !LA

Dear Chief:
not

In reply to your inquiry of April 16, I will
write or vote to overrule Buffalo Forge.
Sincerely,

T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

STYliSTIC CHANGES THROUGHOUT.

f f, /.; 6 JJ S) /~ lf;/'3 I{; :2tJ

/

~

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Marshall

Circulated: --~------.,.,----

At'K ~ 11982
Recirculated: _ ____._.__ __ __ _
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

fl;{w

No. 80-1045

JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS, INC. ET AL., PETITIONERS, v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION ET AL.
~ 1/J~AJ...J/!l!JRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

r Ir

I

v -

-

v ......-,

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[April - , 1982]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider the power of a federal court to enjoin a politically motivated work stoppage in an action
brought by an employer pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U. S. C. § 185(a) to
enforce a union's obligations under a collective-bargaining
agreement. We first address whether the broad anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C.
§ 101 et seq., apply to politically motivated work stoppages.
Finding these provisions applicable, we then consider
whether the work stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398
U. S. 235 (1970), and Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), pending an arbitrator's decision on
whether the strike violates the collective-bargaining
agreement.
I

On January 4, 1980, President Carter announced that, due
to the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, certain
trade with the Soviet Union would be restricted.

80-1045--0PINION
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Superphosphoric acid (SPA), used in agricultural fertilizer,
was not included in the Presidential embargo. 1 On January 9,
1980, respondent International Longshoremen's Association
(ILA) announced that its members would not handle any
cargo bound to, or coming from, the Soviet Union or carried
on Russian ships. 2 In accordance with this resolution, respondent local union, an ILA affiliate, refused to load SPA
bound for the Soviet Union aboard three ships that arrived at
the shipping terminal operated by petitioner Jacksonville
Bulk Terminals, Inc. (JBT) at the Port of Jacksonville, Florida during the month of January 1980.
'On February 25, 1980, the embargo was extended to include SPA along
with other products. On April 24, 1981, President Reagan lifted the SPA
embargo as part of his decision to remove restrictions on the sale of grain
to the Soviets. By telegrams dated April 24, 1981 and June 5, 1981, the
ILA has recommended to its members that they resume handling goods to
and from the Soviet Union. Although the work stoppage is no longer in
effect, there remains a live controversy over whether the collective-bargaining agreement prohibits politically motivated work stoppages, and the
Union may resume such a work stoppage at any time. As a result, this
case is not moot. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S.
397, 403, n. 8 (1976).
2
The President of the ILA made the following announcement:
"In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of
the Union, the leadership of the ILA today ordered immediate suspension
in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to
Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed.
"The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international
events that have affected relations between the U. S. & Soviet Union.
"However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by
the demands of the workers.
"It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes
under present conditions of the world.
"People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy
as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a
decision in which the Union leadership concurs." Brief for Respondents 2,
n. 2.
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In response to this work stoppage, petitioners JBT,
Hooker Chemical Corporation, and Occidental Petroleum
Company (collectively referred to as the Employer) 3 brought
this action pursuant to § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U. S. C.
§ 185(a), against respondents ILA, its affiliated local union,
and its officers and agents (collectively referred to as the
Union). The Employer alleged that the Union's work stoppage violated the collective-bargaining agreement between
the Union and JBT. The Employer sought to compel arbitration under the agreement, requested a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pending arbitration, and sought damages.
The agreement contains both a broad no-strike clause and a
provision requiring the resolution of all disputes through a
grievance procedure, ending in arbitration. 4 The no-strike
clause provides:
"During the term of this Agreement, ... the Union
agrees there shall not be any strike of any kind or degree
whatsoever, ... for any cause whatsoever; such causes
3

JBT is a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxy Chemical Corporation, which
is a subsidiary of Hooker. Ownership of all these corporations is ultimately vested in Occidental. Hooker Chemical Company manufactures
SPA at a manufacturing facility in Florida. Pursuant to a bilateral trade
agreement between Occidental and the Soviet Union, SPA is shipped to
the Soviet Union from the JBT facility in Jacksonville.
4
The grievance and arbitration clause provides in relevant part:
"Matters under dispute which cannot be promptly settled between the
Local and an individual Employer shall . . . be referred . . . to a Port
Grievance Committee. . . . In the event this Port Grievance Committee
cannot reach an agreement . . . the dispute shall be referred to the Joint
Negotiating Committee ... .
"A majority decision of this Committee shall be final and binding on both
parties and on all Employers signing this Agreement. In the event the
Committee is unable to reach a majority decision within 72 hours after
meeting to discuss the case, it shall employ a professional arbitrator . . .. "
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including but not limited to, unfair labor practices by the
Employer or violation of this Agreement. The right of
employees not to cross a bona fide picket line is recognized by the Employer .... "
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida ordered the Union to process its grievance in accordance with the contractual grievance procedure. The District
Court also granted the Employer's request for a preliminary
injunction pending arbitration, reasoning that the political
motivation behind the work stoppage rendered the NorrisLaGuardia Act's anti-injunction provisions inapplicable.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's order to the extent it required
arbitration of the question whether the work stoppage violated the collective-bargaining agreement. New Orleans
Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626
F. 2d 455 (1980). 5 However, the Court of Appeals disagreed
with the District Court's conclusion that the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act are inapplicable to politically motivated work stoppages. Relying on Buffalo Forge, the Court
of Appeals further held that the Employer was not entitled to
an injunction pending arbitration because the underlying dispute was not arbitrable. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply
to this case, and that, under Buffalo Forge, an injunction
pending arbitration may not issue.
II
6
The Union concedes that the question whether the work stoppage violates the no-strike clause is arbitrable. In a consolidated case, the Court
of Appeals upheld an injunction issued by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana enforcing an arbitrator's decision that
the ILA work stoppage violated a collective-bargaining agreement. New
Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F. 2d
455, 469 (CA5 1980).
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Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in part:
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute ... from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 104.
Congress adopted this broad prohibition to remedy the growing tendency of federal courts to enjoin strikes by narrowly
construing the Clayton Act's labor exemption from the Sherman Act's prohibition against conspiracies to restrain trade,
see 29 U.S. C. §52. See, e. g., H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d
Gong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 10-11 (1931). This Court has consistently given the anti-injunction provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act a broad interpretation, recognizing exceptions only in limited situations where necessary to
accommodate the Act to specific federal legislation or paramount congressional policy. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 249-253 (1970); Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353
u. s. 30, 39-42 (1957).
The Boys Markets exception, as refined in Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), is relevant
to our decision today. In Boys Markets, this Court re-examined Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962),
which held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes a federal
district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a collectivebargaining agreement, even where that agreement contains
provisions for binding arbitration of the grievance concerning
which the strike was called. 398 U. S., at 237-238. The
Court overruled Sinclair and held that, in order to accommodate the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia to
the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) and the

., .
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strong federal policy favoring arbitration, it was essential to
recognize an exception to the anti-injunction provisions for
cases in which the employer sought to enforce the union's
contractual obligation to arbitrate grievances rather than to
strike over them. I d., at 249-253. 6
After Boys Markets, the Courts of Appeals divided on the
question whether a strike could be enjoined under the Boys
Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act pending arbitration, when the strike was not over a grievance that the
union had agreed to arbitrate. 7 In Buffalo Forge, the Court
resolved this conflict and held that the Boys Markets exception does not apply when only the question whether the
strike violates the no-strike pledge, and not the dispute that
precipitated the strike, is arbitrable under the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. 8
The Employer argues that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does
not apply in this case because the political motivation underlying the Union's work stoppage removes this controversy
from that Act's definition of a "labor dispute." Alternatively, the Employer argues that this case fits within the exception to that Act recognized in Boys Markets as refined in
Buffalo Forge. We review these arguments in turn.

III
At the outset, we must determine whether this is a "case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute" within the
• In Boys Markets, the underlying dispute was clearly subject to the
grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective-bargaining agreement, and the strike clearly violated the no-strike clause.
7
See cases cited in Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 404, n. 9.
8
In Buffalo Forge, the strike at issue was a sympathy strike in support
of sister unions negotiating with the employer. The Court reasoned that
there was no need to accommodate the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to § 301 and to the federal policy favoring arbitration when a strike is
not called over an arbitrable dispute, because such a strike does not directly frustrate the arbitration process by denying or evading the union's
promise to arbitrate. 428 U. S., at 407-412.
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meaning of §4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S. C.
§ 104. Section 13(c) of the Act broadly defines the term
labor dispute to include "any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 113(c). 9
The Employer argues that the existence of political motives takes this work stoppage controversy outside the broad
scope of this definition. This argument, however, has no
basis in the plain statutory language of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act or in our prior interpretations of that Act. Furthermore, the argument is contradicted by the legislative history
of not only the Norris-LaGuardia Act but also the 1947
amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
A
An action brought by an employer against the union representing its employees to enforce a no-strike pledge generally
involves two controversies. First, there is the "underlying
dispute," which is the event or condition that triggers the
work stoppage. This dispute may or may not be political,
and it may or may not be arbitrable under the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. Second, there is the parties'
dispute over whether the no-strike pledge prohibits the work
stoppage at issue. This second dispute can always form the
basis for federal court jurisdiction, because § 301(a) gives federal courts jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U. S. C.
§ 185(a).
It is beyond cavil that the second form of dispute-whether
the collective-bargaining agreement either forbids or permits
the union to refuse to perform certain work-is a "controSection 13(c) provides:
"(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
9
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versy concerning the terms or conditions of employment."
29 U.S. C. §113(c). This §301 action was brought toresolve just such a controversy. In its complaint, the Employer did not seek to enjoin the intervention of the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan, nor did it ask the District Court to decide whether the Union was justified in expressing disapproval of the Soviet Union's actions. Instead, the Employer
sought to enjoin the Union's decision not to provide labor, a
decision which the Employer believed violated the terms of
the collective-bargaining agreement. It is this contract dispute, and not the political dispute, that the arbitrator will resolve, and on which the courts are asked to rule.
The plain language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not
except labor disputes having their genesis in political protests. Nor is there any basis in the statutory language for
the argument that the Act requires that each dispute relevant to the case be a labor dispute. The Act merely requires
that the case involve "any" labor dispute. Therefore, the
plain terms of § 4(a) and § 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprive the federal courts of the power to enjoin the Union's
work stoppage in this § 301 action, without regard to whether
the Union also has a nonlabor dispute with another entity. 10
The conclusion that this case involves a labor dispute
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act comports
with this Court's consistent interpretation of that Act. 11 Our
10
Of course, there are exceptions to the Act's prohibitions against enjoining work stoppages. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union , 398 U. S. 235 (1970). The employer may obtain an injunction to
enforce an arbitrator's decision that the strike violates the collective-bargaining agreement and can recover damages for the violation, pursuant to
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U. S. C. § 185.
See, e. g., Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 405. See also 15-16, and note 18,
infra (discussing Board's authority under 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1), to
petition for an injunction upon finding reasonable cause to believe that the
strike is an unfair labor practice).
n The Employer's reliance on Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556
(1978), to argue that a politically motivated strike is not a labor dispute is
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decisions have recognized that the term "labor dispute" must
not be narrowly construed because the statutory definition itself is extremely broad and because Congress deliberately included a broad definition to overrule judicial decisions that
had unduly restricted the Clayton Act's labor exemption from
the antitrust laws. For example, in Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U. S. 365, 369 (1960),
the Court observed:
"Th[e] Act's language is broad. The language is
broad because Congress was intent upon taking the federal courts out of the labor injunction business except in
the very limited circumstances left open for federal jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The history
and background that led Congress to take this view have
misplaced. In Eastex, we addressed whether certain concerted activity
was protected under § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 157, and we recognized that "[t]here may well be types of conduct or speech that are so
purely political or so remotely connected to the concerns of employees as
employees as to be beyond the protection of§ 7." !d., at 570, n. 20. Although the definition of a "labor dispute" in § 2(9) of the NLRA, 29
U. S. C. § 152(9), is virtually identical to that in § 13(c) of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 113(c), and the two provisions have been construed consistently with one another, e. g., United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U. S. 219, 234, n. 4 (1941), this similarity does not advance the Employer's argument. Union activity that prompts a "labor dispute" within
the meaning of these sections may be protected by§ 7, prohibited by§ 8(b),
29 U. S. C. § 158(b), or neither protected nor prohibited. The objective of
the concerted activity is relevant in determining whether such activity is
protected under§ 7 or prohibited by§ 8(b), but not in determining whether
the activity is a "labor dispute" under § 2(9).
Moreover, the conclusion that a purely political work stoppage is not protected under § 7 means simply that the employer is not prohibited by
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1), from discharging or disciplining employees for this activity. It hardly establishes that no "labor
dispute" existed within the meaning of § 2(9). Similarly, if the employees
protested such sanctions under the collective-bargaining agreement, an arbitrator might ultimately conclude that the sanctions were proper, but this
would not alter the obvious fact that the matter is a labor dispute.
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been adverted to in a number of prior opinions of this
Court in which we refused to give the Act narrow interpretations that would have restored many labor dispute
controversies to the courts." (emphasis added; footnote
omitted)
The critical element in determining whether the provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply is whether "the employeremployee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy."
Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton, 315 U. S.
143, 147 (1942). In this case, the Employer and the Union
representing its employees are the disputants, and their dispute concerns the interpretation of the labor contract that defines their relationship. 12 Thus, the employer-employee relationship is the matrix of this controversy.
Nevertheless, the Employer argues that a "labor dispute"
exists only when the Union's action is taken in its own "economic self-interest." The Employer cites American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99 (1968), and Columbia River Packers Association, supra, for this proposition.
In these cases, however, the Court addressed the very different question whether the relevant parties were "labor"
groups involved in a labor dispute for the purpose of determining whether their actions were exempt from the antitrust
laws. 13 These cases do not hold that a union's noneconomic
A labor dispute might be present under the facts of this case even in
the absence of the dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause. Regardless of the political nature of the Union's objections to handling Sovietbound cargo, these objections were expressed in a work stoppage by employees against their employer, which focused on particular work
assignments. Thus, apart from the collective-bargaining agreement, the
employer-employee relationship would be the matrix of the controversy.
We need not decide this question, however, because this case does involve
a dispute over the interpretation of the parties' collective-bargaining
agreement.
13
In American Federation of Musicians, the Court held that, although
orchestra leaders acted as independent contractors with respect to certain
12
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motive inevitably takes the dispute out of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, but only that that protections of that Act do
not extend to labor organizations when they cease to act as
labor groups or when they enter into illegal combinations
with nonlabor groups in restraint of trade. 14 Here, there is no
question that the Union is a labor group, representing its
own interests in a dispute with the Employer over the employees' obligation to provide labor.
Even in cases where the disputants did not stand in the
relationship of employer and employee, this Court has held
that the existence of noneconomic motives does not make the
Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable. For example, in New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552
(1938), this Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited an injunction against picketing by members of a civic
group, which was aimed at inducing a store to employ Negro
employees. In determining that the group and its members
were "persons interested in a labor dispute" within the mean"club-date" engagements, the union's involvement with the leaders was not
a combination with a nonlabor group in violation of the Sherman Act. In
finding that leaders were a "labor group," and a party to a labor dispute,
the Court relied on the "'presence of a job or wage competition or some
other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests between the union members and the independent contractors."' 391 U. S.,
at 106 (quoting the opinion of the District Court). In Hinton, the Court
found that the union was merely an association of independent fish sellers
involved in a controversy with fish buyers over a contract for the sale of
fish; they were not employees of the buyers, nor did they seek to be. 315
U.S., at 147.
The Employer's reliance on Bakery Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333
U. S. 437 (1948), is similarly misplaced. In that case, the Court held only
that a controversy between two businessmen over delivery times or methods of payment does not become a labor dispute merely because a union
representative, with or without his employer's consent, sought to obtain
payment pursuant to a particular method. Id., at 443-444.
"The Employer's economic-motive analysis also leads to the untenable
result that strikes in protest of unreasonably unsafe conditions and some
sympathy strikes are not "labor disputes."
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ing of § 13, the Court found it immaterial that the picketers,
who were neither union organizers nor store employees,
were not asserting economic interests commonly associated
with labor unions-e. g., terms and conditions of employment
in the narrower sense of wages, hours, unionization or betterment of working conditions. I d., at 560. Although the
lower courts found Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable because
the picketing was motivated by the group's "political" or "social" goals of improving the position of Negroes generally,
and not by the desire to improve specific conditions of employment, this Court reasoned: "The Act does not concern itself with the background or the motives of the dispute." 303
U. S., at 561.
B

The Employer's argument that the Union's motivation for
engaging in a work stoppage determines whether the NorrisLaGuardia Act applies is also contrary to the legislative history of that Act. The Act was enacted in response to federal
court intervention on behalf of employers through the use of
injunctive powers against unions and other associations of
employees. This intervention had caused the federal judiciary to fall into disrepute among large segments of this Nation's population. See generally S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 8, 1~18 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4915 (1932) (remarks
of Sen. Wagner).
Apart from the procedural unfairness of many labor injunctions, one of the greatest evils associated with them was the
use of tort-law doctrines, which often made the lawfulness of
a strike depend upon judicial views of social and economic
policy. See, e. g., Cox, Current Problems in the Law of
Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 247, 256
(1958). In debating the Act, its supporters repeatedly expressed disapproval of this Court's interpretations of the
Clayton Act's labor exemption-interpretations which permitted a federal judge to find the Act inapplicable based on
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his or her appraisal of the "legitimacy" of the union's objectives. 15 See, e. g., 75 Cong. Rec. 4916 (1932) (remarks of Sen.
Wagner) (definition of labor dispute expanded to overrule
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921)~~
(holding a strike and picketing with the purpose of unionizing
a plant not a labor dispute because the objectives were not
legitimate and there was no employer-employee relationship
between the disputants)); id., at 5487-5488 (remarks of Sen.
Geller) (bill brought forth to remedy decisions allowing injunction in Duplex and in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone
Cutters Association, 274 U. S. 37 (1927)~(holding that decision by workers not to work on nonunion goods not a labor
dispute)). See also id., at 4686 (remarks of Sen. Hebert)
(committee minority agreed that injunctions should not have
issued in Bedford and Duplex). See generally H.R. Rep.
No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 10-11 (1932). The legislative history is replete with criticisms of the ability of powerful employers to use federal judges as "strike-breaking"
agencies; by virtue of their almost unbridled "equitable discretion," federal judges could enter injunctions based on their
disapproval of the employees' objectives, or on the theory
that these objectives or actions, although lawful if pursued by
a single employee, became unlawful when pursued through
the "conspiracy" of concerted activity. See, e. g., 75 Cong.
Rec. 4928-4938 (1932); id., at 5466--5468; id., at 5478--5481;
id., at 5487-5490.
Furthermore, the question whether the Norris-LaGuardia
Act would apply to politically motivated strikes was brought
to the attention of the 72nd Congress when it passed the Act.
Opponents criticized the definition of "labor dispute" in
§ 13(c) on the ground that it would cover politically motivated
strikes. Representative Beck argued that federal courts
See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 468-469
(1921). See also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Association, 274
u. s. 37, 54-55 (1927).
15
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should have jurisdiction to enjoin political strikes like those
threatened by labor unions in Europe. 75 Cong. Rec.
5471-5473 (1932) (discussing threatened strike by British
unions protesting the cancellation of leases held by Communist Party members, and threatened strikes by Belgian
unions protesting a decision to supply military aid to Poland). 16 In response, Representative Oliver argued that the
federal courts should not have the power to enjoin such
strikes. !d., at 5480-5481. Finally, Representative Beck
offered an amendment to the Act that would have permitted
federal courts to enjoin strikes called for ulterior purposes,
including political motives. This amendment was defeated
soundly. See id., at 5507.
Further support for our conclusion that Congress believed
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to work stoppages instituted for political reasons can be found in the legislative
history of the 1947 amendments to the NLRA. That history \
reveals that Congress rejected a proposal to repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act with respect to one broad category of political strikes. 17 The House bill included definitions of various
kinds of labor disputes. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1 Legislative History of the LMRA 158 (1947) (Leg.
His.); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Con., 1st Sess., 18-19, 1 Leg.
•• The thrust of this objection was that the Act's definition of a labor dis- \
pute "takes no account whatever of the motives and purposes with which a
nation-wide strike or boycott can be commenced and prosecuted." 75
Cong. Rec. 5472 (1932) (remarks of Rep. Beck).
17
In relying on this history, we do not argue that congressional rejection
of a broad repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes accommodation of
that Act to the LMRA. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S.
195, 204-210 (1962). In Boys Markets Co. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398
U. S. 235, 249 (1970), this Court put that argument to rest. Rather, we
rely on this legislative history because it demonstrates that Congress believed that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply to controversies concerning
politically motivated work stoppages. Furthermore, in this case, unlike
Boys Markets, we are not asked to accommodate the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to a specific federal act or to the strong policy favoring arbitration.
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His. 292, 309-310. Of relevance here, § 2(13) defined a "sympathy" strike as a strike "called or conducted not by reason of
any dispute between the employer and the employees on
strike or participating in such concerted interference, but
rather by reason of either (A) a dispute involving another employer or other employees of the same employer, or (B) disagreement with some governmental policy." H.R. 3020,
§ 2(13), 1 Leg. His. 168 (emphasis added). Section 12 of the
House bill made this kind of strike "unlawful concerted activity," and "it remove[d] the immunities that the present laws
confer upon persons who engage in them." H.R. Rep. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 1 Leg. His. 314. In particular,
the Norris-LaGuardia Act would not apply to suits brought
by private parties to enjoin such activity, and damages could
be recovered. See id., at 23-24, 43-44, 1 Leg. His. 314-315,
334-335. In explaining these provisions, the House Report
stated that strikes "against a policy of national or local government, which the employer cannot change," should be
made unlawful, and that "[t]he bill makes inapplicable in such
suits the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which heretofore has pro. tected parties to industrial strife from the consequences of
their lawlessness." !d., at 24, 44, 1 Leg. His. 315, 335.
The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version,
which had eliminated these provisions of the House bill. 18
The Conference Report explained that its recommendation
did not go as far as the House bill, that § 8(b) prohibits juris8
' The Senate had declined to adopt these provisions of the House bill.
The Senate Report explained that it did not want to impair labor's social
gains under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA of 1935, but instead
wanted to remedy "specific types of injustice" or "clear inequities" by "precise and carefully drawn legislation." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 1 Leg. His. 407. Some of the concerted activities listed in § 12 of
the House bill were made unfair labor practices, and the National Labor
Relations Board, not private parties, could petition a district court for injunctions against certain unfair labor practices. See i d., at 35, 40, 1 Leg.
His. 441, 446 (reciting proposed revisions to NLRA, §§ 8(b), lO(k), 10(1)).
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dictional strikes and illegal secondary boycotts, and that the
Board, not private parties, may petition a district court
under § lO(k) or § 10(1) to enjoin these activities notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 36, 42-43, 57, 5~9, 1
Leg. His. 540, 54(H)47, 561, 562-563. In short, Congress
declined in 1947 to adopt a broad "political motivation" exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act for strikes in protest of
some governmental policy. Instead, if a strike of this nature
takes the form of a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8(b),
Congress chose to give the Board, not private parties, the
power to petition a federal district court for an injunction.
See 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1).

c
This case, brought by the Employer to enforce its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union, involves a "labor
dispute" within any common-sense meaning of that term.
Were we to ignore this plain interpretation and hold that the
political motivation underlying the work stoppage removes
this controversy from the prohibitions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, we would embroil federal judges in the very
scrutiny of "legitimate objectives" that Congress intended to
prevent when it passed that Act. The applicability not only
of § 4, but of all of the procedural protections embodied in
that Act, would turn on a single federal judge's perception of
the motivation underlying the concerted activity. 19 The Em19
This proposed exception does not limit the judge's discretion to consideration of specified external conduct or of provisions in a collective-bargaining agreement, as does the Boys Markets exception. It provides no
guidance to judges in dealing with concerted activity arguably designed to
achieve both political and labor-related goals. Such mixed-motivation
cases are bound to arise. For example, in United States Steel Corp. v.
United Mine Workers, 519 F. 2d 1236 (CA5 1975), miners picketed another
employer for importing coal from South Africa. The Court of Appeals
held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied, and that the Boys Markets ex-
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ployer's interpretation is simply inconsistent with the need,
expressed by Congress when it enacted the NorrisLaGuardia Act, for clear "mileposts for judges to follow." 75
Cong. Rec. 4935 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bratton).
In essence, the Employer asks us to disregard the legislative history of the Act and to distort the definition of a labor
dispute in order to reach what it believes to be an "equitable"
result. The Employer's real complaint, however, is not with
the Union's political objections to the conduct of the Soviet
Union, but with what the Employer views as the Union's
breach of contract. The Employer's frustration with this alleged breach of contract should not be remedied by characterizing it as other than a labor dispute. We will not adopt
by judicial fiat an interpretation that Congress specifically rejected when it enacted the 1947 amendments to the NLRA.
See note 17, supra. In the past, we have consistently declined to constrict Norris-LaGuardia's broad prohibitions except in narrowly defined situations where accommodation of
that Act to specific congressional policy is necessary. We
refuse to deviate from that path today.
IV
Alternatively, the Employer argues that the Union's work
stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), and
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397
(1976), because the dispute underlying the work stoppage is
arbitrable under the collective-bargaining agreement. In
ception was not available, because "the miners' action was not aimed at
[their employer] at all, but rather at the national policy of this country's
permitting the importation of South African coal." 519 F. 2d, at 1247
(footnote omitted). Under the political-motivation exception, even if the
miners had picketed because slave labor was employed to mine the imported coal, the Norris-LaGuardia Act might not apply. Minor variations
in the facts would endow the courts with, or divest them of, jurisdiction to
issue an injunction, and would create difficult line-drawing problems.
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making this argument, the Employer disavows its earlier argument that the underlying dispute is purely political, and
asserts that the Union's work stoppage was motivated by a
disagreement with the Employer over the managementrights clause in the collective-bargaining agreement. The
Solicitor General, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the
United States, agrees with the Employer that the work stoppage may be enjoined pending arbitration. He contends that
in addition to the political dispute, disputes concerning both
the management-rights clause and the work-conditions clause
underlie the work stoppage, and that at least one of these disputes is arguably arbitrable. 20
We disagree. Buffalo Forge makes it clear that a Boys
Markets injunction pending arbitration should not issue unless the dispute underlying the work stoppage is arbitrable.
The rationale of Buffalo Forge compels the conclusion that
the Union's work stoppage, called to protest the invasion of
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, may not be enjoined pending the arbitrator's decision on whether the work stoppage
violates the no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining
agreement. The underlying dispute, whether viewed as an
The management-rights clause provides:
"The Management of the Employer's business and the direction of the
work force in the operation of the business are exclusively vested in the
Employer as functions of Management. Except as specifically provided in
the Agreement, all of the rights, powers, and authority Employer had
prior to signing of this Agreement are retained by the Employer."
The work-conditions clause provides:
"Where hardship is claimed by the Union because of unreasonable or
burdensome conditions or where work methods or operations materially
change in the future, the problem shall first be discussed between the local
and Management involved. In the event an agrement cannot be reached,
either party may refer the dispute to the Joint Negotiating Committee
and, if the matter cannot be resolved by that Committee, either party may
then refer the question to an arbitrator in accordance with the procedure
set forth in Clause 15(B)."
20
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expression of the Union's "moral outrage" at Soviet military
policy or as an expression of sympathy for the people of Afghanistan, is plainly not arbitrable under the collective-bargaining agreement.
The attempts by the Solicitor General and the Employer to
characterize the underlying dispute as arbitrable do not withstand analysis. The "underlying" disputes concerning the
management-rights clause or the work-conditions clause simply did not trigger the work stoppage. To the contrary, the
applicability of these clauses to the dispute, if any, was triggered by the work stoppage itself. Consideration of
whether the strike intruded on the management-rights clause
or was permitted by the work-conditions clause may inform
the arbitrator's ultimate decision on whether the strike violates the no-strike clause. Indeed, the question whether
striking over a nonarbitrable issue violates other provisions
of the collective-bargaining agreement may itself be an arbitrable dispute. The fact remains, however, that the strike
itself was not over an arbitrable dispute and therefore may
not be enjoined pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality
of the strike under the collective-bargaining agreement.
The weaknesses in the analysis of the Employer and the
Solicitor General can perhaps best be demonstrated by applying it to a pure sympathy strike, which clearly cannot be enjoined pending arbitration under the rationale of Buffalo
Forge. If this work stoppage were a pure sympathy strike,
it could be characterized alternatively as a dispute over the
Employer's right to choose to do business with the employer
embroiled in a dispute with a sister union, as a dispute over
management's right to assign and direct work, or as a dispute
over whether requiring the union to handle goods of the employer whose employees are on strike is an unreasonable
work condition. 21 None of these characterizations, however,
In fact, the employer in Buffalo Forge made just such a claim. In
addition to alleging breach of the no-strike clause, it claimed that the strike
21
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alters the fact, essential to the rationale of Buffalo Forge,
that the strike was not over an arbitrable issue and therefore
did not directly frustrate the arbitration process.
The Employer's argument that this work stoppage may be
enjoined pending arbitration really reflects a fundamental
disagreement with the rationale of Buffalo Forge, and not a
belief that this rationale permits an injunction in this case.
The Employer apparently disagrees with the Buffalo Forge
Court's conclusion that, in agreeing to broad arbitration and
no-strike clauses, the parties do not bargain for injunctive relief to restore the status quo pending the arbitrator's decision
on the legality of the strike under the collective-bargaining
agreement, without regard to what triggered the strike. Instead, they bargain only for specific enforcement of the
union's promise to arbitrate the underlying grievance before
resorting to a strike. See 428 U. S., at 410-412. The Employer also apparently believes that Buffalo Forge frustrates
the arbitration process and encourages industrial strife. But
see id., at 412. 22 However, this disagreement with Buffalo
was caused by "refusal to follow a supervisor's instructions to cross the .. .
picket line." Buffalo Forge, supra, at 401. The district court found that
the strike was in sympathy with the sister union and was not over a dispute
that the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. !d., at 402-403.
On appeal, the employer did not press its argument that the work stoppage
was in part a protest over truck driving assignments. !d., at 403, n. 8.
22
The Employer argues that industrial strife is encouraged because employers are given the incentive to discharge or discipline the workers for
refusing to work, which is likely to precipitate further strikes. According
to this argument, the strike, which began over a nonarbitrable dispute, is
transformed into a dispute over an arbitrable issue, i. e. the employer's
right under the collective-bargaining agreement to discipline these workers, and may be enjoined under the Boys Markets/Buffalo Forge exception. See, e. g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F. 2d 1110,
1113-1114 (CA6 1980), affd on other grounds 451 U. S. 401 (1981). This
Court has not addressed the validity of this "transformation" analysis.
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S., at 405, n. 4.
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Forge only argues for reconsidering that decision. 23 It does
not justify distorting the rationale of that case beyond recognition in order to reach the result urged by the Employer.

v
In conclusion, we hold that an employer's § 301 action to
enforce the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement
allegedly violated by a union's work stoppage involves a
"labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, without regard to the motivation underlying the union's
decision not to provide labor. Under our decisions in Boys
Markets and Buffalo Forge, when the underlying dispute is
not arbitrable, the employer may not obtain injunctive relief
pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality of the strike
under the collective-bargaining agreement.
Affirmed.

23

The Employer has also requested that we reconsider our decision in
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976). We decline this invitation.
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In this case, we consider the power of a federal court to enjoin a politically motivated work stoppage in an action
brought by an employer pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U. S. C. § 185(a), to ~ ~
enforce a union's obligations under a collective-bargaining
agreement. We first address whether the broad anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C.
§ 101 et seq., apply to politically motivated work stoppages.
Finding these provisions applicable, we then consider ~
whether the work stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of Boys Markets , Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 ~
U. S. 235 (1970), and Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers , 428 U. S. 397 (1976), pending an arbitrator's decision on 5~/-R---. 1,
whether the strike violates the collective-bargaining
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agreement.
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On January 4, 1980, President Carter announced that, due
to the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, certain
trade with the Soviet Union would be restricted.

J~
<
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Superphosphoric acid (SPA), used in agricultural fertilizer,
was not included in the Presidential embargo.' On January 9,
1980, respondent International Longshoremen's Association
(ILA) announced that its members would not handle any
cargo bound to, or coming from, the Soviet Union or carried
on Russian ships. 2 In accordance with this resolution, respondent local union, an ILA affiliate, refused to load SPA
bound for the Soviet Union aboard three ships that arrived at
the shipping terminal operated by petitioner Jacksonville
Bulk Terminals, Inc. (JBT) at the Port of Jacksonville, Florida during the month of January 1980.
On February 25, 1980, the embargo was extended to include SPA along
with other products. On April 24, 1981, President Reagan lifted the SPA
embargo as part of his decision to remove restrictions on the sale of grain
to the Soviets. By telegrams dated April 24, 1981 and June 5, 1981, the
ILA has recommended to its members that they resume handling goods to
and from the Soviet Union. Although the work stoppage is no longer in
effect, there remains a live controversy over whether the collective-bargaining agreement prohibits politically motivated work stoppages, and the
Union may resume such a work stoppage at any time. As a result, this
case is not moot. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S.
397, 403, n. 8 (1976).
• The President of the ILA made the following announcement:
"In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of
the Union, the leadership of the ILA today ordered immediate suspension
in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to
Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed.
1

"The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international
events that have affected relations between the U. S. & Soviet Union.
"However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by
the demands of the workers.
"It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes
under present conditions of the world.
"People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy
as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a
decision in which the Union leadership concurs." Brieffor Respondents 2,
n. 2.
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In response to this work stoppage, petitioners JBT,
Hooker Chemical Corporation, and Occidental Petroleum
Company (collectively referred to as the Employer) 3 brought
this action pursuant to §301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U. S. C.
§ 185(a), against respondents ILA, its affiliated local union,
and its officers and agents (collectively referred to as the
Union). The Employer alleged that the Union's work stoppage violated the collective-bargaining agreement between
the Union and JBT. The Employer sought to compel arbitration under the agreement, requested a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pending arbitration, and sought damages.
The agreement contains both a broad no-strike clause and a
provision requiring the resolution of all disputes through a
grievance procedure, ending in arbitration. 4 The no-strike
clause provides:
"During the term of this Agreement, ... the Union
agrees there shall not be any strike of any kind or degree
whatsoever, ... for any cause whatsoever; such causes
including but not limited to, unfair labor practices by the
JBT is a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxy Chemical Corporation, which
is a subsidiary of Hooker. Ownership of all these corporations is ultimately vested in Occidental. Hooker Chemical Company manufactures
SPA at a manufacturing facility in Florida. Pursuant to a bilateral trade
agreement between Occidental and the Soviet Union, SPA is shipped to
the Soviet Union from the JBT facility in Jacksonville.
' The grievance and arbitration clause provides in relevant part:
"Matters under dispute which cannot be promptly settled between the
Local and an individual Employer shall . . . be referred . . . to a Port
Grievance Committee. . . . In the event this Port Grievance Committee
cannot reach an agreement ... the dispute shall be referred to the Joint
Negotiating Committee ... .
3

"A majority decision of this Committee shall be final and binding on both
parties and on all Employers signing this Agreement. In the event the
Committee is unable to reach a majority decision within 72 hours after
meeting to discuss the case, it shall employ a professional arbitrator... . "
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Employer or violation of this Agreement. The right of
employees not to cross a bona fide picket line is recognized by the Employer.... "
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida ordered the Union to process its grievance in accordance with the contractual grievance procedure. The District
Court also granted the Employer's request for a preliminary
injunction pending arbitration, reasoning that the political
motivation behind the work stoppage rendered the NorrisLaGuardia Act's anti-injunction provisions inapplicable.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's order to the extent it required
arbitration of the question whether the work stoppage violated the collective-bargaining agreement. New Orleans
Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626
F. 2d 455 (1980). 5 However, the Court of Appeals disagreed
with the District Court's conclusion that the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act are inapplicable to politically motivated work stoppages. Relying on Buffalo Forge, the Court
of Appeals further held that the Employer was not entitled to
an injunction pending arbitration because the underlying dispute was not arbitrable. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply
to this case, and that, under Buffalo Forge, an injunction
pending arbitration may not issue.
II

Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in part:
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction
•The Union concedes that the question whether the work stoppage violates the no-strike clause is arbitrable. In a consolidated case, the Court
of Appeals upheld an injunction issued by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana enforcing an arbitrator's decision that
the ILA work stoppage violated a collective-bargaining agreement. New
Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F. 2d
455, 469 (CA5 1980).
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to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute ... from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 104.
Congress adopted this broad prohibition to remedy the growing tendency of federal courts to enjoin strikes by narrowly
construing the Clayton Act's labor exemption from the Sherman Act's prohibition against conspiracies to restrain trade,
see 29 U. S. C. §52. See, e. g., H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 10-11 (1931). This Court has consistently given the anti-injunction provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act a broad interpretation, recognizing exceptions only in limited situations where necessary to
accommodate the Act to specific federal legislation or paramount congressional policy. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 249-253 (1970); Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353
u. s. 30, 39-42 (1957).
The Boys Markets exception, as refined in Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), is relevant
to our decision today. In Boys Markets, this Court re-examined Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962),
which held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes a federal
district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a collectivebargaining agreement, even where that agreement contains
provisions for binding arbitration of the grievance concerning
which the strike was called. 398 U. S., at 237-238. The
Court overruled Sinclair and held that, in order to accommodate the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia to
the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) and the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration, it was essential to
recognize an exception to the anti-injunction provisions for
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cases in which the employer sought to enforce the union's
contractual obligation to arbitrate grievances rather than to
strike over them. I d., at 24~253. 6
After Boys Markets, the Courts of Appeals divided on the
question whether a strike could be enjoined under the Boys
Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act pending arbitration, when the strike was not over a grievance that the
union had agreed to arbitrate. 7 In Buffalo Forge, the Court
resolved this conflict and held that the Boys Markets exception does not apply when only the question whether the
strike violates the no-strike pledge, and not the dispute that
precipitated the strike, is arbitrable under the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. 8
The Employer argues that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does
not apply in this case because the political motivation underlying the Union's work stoppage removes this controversy
from that Act's definition of a "labor dispute." Alternatively, the· Employer argues that this case fits within the exception to that Act recognized in Boys Markets as refined in
Buffalo Forge. We review these arguments in turn.

III
At the outset, we must determine whether this is a "case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute" within the
meaning of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C.
' In Boys Markets, the underlying dispute was clearly subject to the
grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective-bargaining agreement, and the strike clearly violated the no-strike clause.
7
See cases cited in Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 404, n. 9.
8
In Buffalo Forge, the strike at issue was a sympathy strike in support
of sister unions negotiating with the employer. The Court reasoned that
there was no need to accommodate the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to § 301 and to the federal policy favoring arbitration when a strike is
not called over an arbitrable dispute, because such a strike does not directly frustrate the arbitration process by denying or evading the union's
promise to arbitrate. 428 U. S., at 407-412.
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§ 104. Section 13(c) of the Act broadly defines the term
labor dispute to include "any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 113(c). 9
The Employer argues that the existence of political motives takes this work stoppage controversy outside the broad
scope of this definition. This argument, however, has no
basis in the plain statutory language of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act or in our prior interpretations of that Act. Furthermore, the argument is contradicted by the legislative history
of not only the Norris-LaGuardia Act but also the 1947
amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

A
. An action brought by an employer against the union representing its employees to enforce a no-strike pledge generally
involves two controversies. First, there is the "underlying
dispute," which is the event or condition that triggers the
work stoppage. This dispute may or may not be political,
and it may or may not be arbitrable under the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. Second, there is the parties'
dispute over whether the no-strike pledge prohibits the work
stoppage at issue. This second dispute can always form the
basis for federal court jurisdiction, because § 301(a) gives federal courts jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U. S. 'J.
§ 185(a).
It is beyond cavil that the second form of dispute-whether
the collective-bargaining agreement either forbids or permits
the union to refuse to perform certain work-is a "contro• Section 13(c) provides:
"(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
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versy concerning the terms or conditions of employment."
29 U. S. C. § 113(c). This § 301 action was brought to resolve just such a controversy. In its complaint, the Employer did not seek to enjoin the intervention of the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan, nor did it ask the District Court to decide whether the Union was justified in expressing disapproval of the Soviet Union's actions. Instead, the Employer
sought to enjoin the Union's decision not to provide labor, a
decision which the Employer believed violated the terms of
the collective-bargaining agreement. It is this contract dispute, and not the political dispute, that the arbitrator will resolve, and on which the courts are asked to rule.
The plain language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not \
except labor disputes having their genesis in political protests. Nor is
re any basis in the statuto language for
the argument that the ct requires t at each dispute relevant to the case beaTaoor dispute. The Act merely requires
that the case involve "any" labor dispute. Therefore, the
plain terms of § 4(a) and § 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprive the federal courts of the power to enjoin the Union's
work stoppage in this§ 301 action, without regard to whether
the Union also has a nonlabor dispute with another entity. 10
The conclusion that this case involves a labor dispute
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act comports
with this Court's consistent int ~rpretation of that Act. 11 Our

l

10
Of course, there are exceptions to the Act's prohibitions against enjoining work stoppages. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). The employer may obtain an injunction to
enforce an arbitrator's decision that the strike violates the collective-bargaining agreement and can recover damages for the violation, pursuant to
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U. S. C. § 185.
See, e. g., Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 405. See also 15-16, and note 18,
infra (discussing Board's authority under 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1), to
petition for an injunction upon finding reasonable cause to believe that the
strike is an unfair labor practice).
"The Employer's reliance on Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB , 437 U. S. 556
(1978), to argue that a politically motivated strike is not a labor dispute is
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decisions have recognized that the tenn "labor dispute" must
not be narrowly construed because the statutory definition itself is extremely broad and because Congress deliberately included a broad definition to overrule judicial decisions that
had unduly restricted the Clayton Act's labor exemption from
the antitrust laws. For example, in Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U. S. 365, 369 (1960),
the Court observed:
"Th[e] Act's language is broad. The language is
broad because Congress was intent upon taking the federal courts out of the labor injunction business except in
the very limited circumstances left open for federal jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The history
and background that led Congress to take this view have
misplaced. In Eastex, we addressed whether certain concerted activity
was protected under § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 157, and we recognized that "[t]here may well be types of conduct or speech that are so
purely political or so remotely connected to the concerns of employees as
employees as to be beyond the protection of§ 7." !d., at 570, n. 20. Although the definition of a "labor dispute" in § 2(9) of the NLRA, 29
U. S. C. § 152(9), is virtually identical to that in § 13(c) of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 113(c), and the two provisions have been construed consistently with one another, e. g., United States v. Hutcheson,
312 F . S. 219, 234, n. 4 (1941), this similarity does not advance the Employ~ :'s argument.
Union activity that prompts a "labor dispute" within
the meaning of these sections may be protected by§ 7, prohibited by§ 8(b),
29 U. S. C. § 158(b), or neither protected nor prohibited. The objective of
the concerted activity is relevant in determining whether such activity is
protected under§ 7 or prohibited by§ 8(b), but not in determining whether
the activity is a "labor dispute" under § 2(9).
Moreover, the conclusion that a purely political work stoppage is not protected under § 7 means simply that the employer is not prohibited by
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1), from discharging or disciplining employees for this activity. It hardly establishes that no "labor
dispute" existed within the meaning of§ 2(9). Similarly, if the employees
protested such sanctions under the collective-bargaining agreement, an arbitrator might ultimately conclude that the sanctions were proper, but this
would not alter the obvious fact that the matter is a labor dispute.
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been adverted to in a number of prior opinions of this
Court in which we refused to give the Act narrow interpretations that would have restored many labor dispute
controversies to the courts." (emphasis added; footnote
omitted)
The critical element in determining whether the provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply is whether "the employeremployee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy."
Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton, 315 U. S.
143, 147 (1942). In this case, the Employer and the Union
representing its employees are the disputants, and their dispute concerns the interpretation of the labor contract that defines their relationship. 12 Thus, the employer-employee relationship is the matrix of this controversy.
Nevertheless, the Employer argues that a "labor dispute"
exists only when the Union's action is taken in its own "economic self.:.interest." The Employer cites American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99 (1968), and Columbia River Packers Association, supra, for this proposition.
In these cases, however, the Court addressed the very different question whether the relevant parties were "labor''
groups involved in a labor dispute for the purpose of determining whether their actions were exempt from the antitrust
laws. 13 These cases do not hold that a union's noneconomic
12
A labor dispute might be present under the facts of this case even in
the absence of the dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause. Regardless of the political nature of the Union's objections to handling Sovietbound cargo, these objections were expressed in a work stoppage by employees against their employer, which focused on particular work
assignments. Thus, apart from the collective-bargaining agreement, the
employer-employee relationship would be the matrix of the controversy.
We need not decide this question, however, because this case does involve
a dispute over the interpretation of the parties' collective-bargaining
agreement.
18
In American Federation of Musicians, the Court held that, although
orchestra leaders acted as independent contractors with respect to certain

. 80-1045--0PINION
JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS v. LONGSHOREMEN 11

motive inevitably takes the dispute out of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, but only that that protections of that Act do
not extend to labor organizations when they cease to act as
labor groups or when they enter into illegal combinations
with nonlabor groups in restraint of trade. 14 Here, there is no
question that the Union is a labor group, representing its
own interests in a dispute with the Employer over the employees' obligation to provide labor.
Even in cases where the disputants did not stand in the
relationship of employer and employee, this Court has held
that the existence of noneconomic motives does not make the
Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable. For example, in New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552
(1938), this Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited an injunction against picketing by members of a civic
group, which was aimed at inducing a store to employ Negro
employees. In determining that the group and its members
were "persons interested in a labor dispute" within the mean"club-date" engagements, the union's involvement with the leaders was not
a combination with a nonlabor group in violation of the Sherman Act. In
finding that leaders were a "labor group," and a party to a labor dispute,
the Court relied on the "'presence of a job or wage competition or some
other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests between the union members and the independent contractors."' 391 U. S.,
at 106 (quoting the opinion of the District Court). In Hinton, the Court
found that the union was merely an association of independent fish sellers
involved in a controversy with fish buyers over a contract for the sale of
fish; they were not employees of the buyers, nor did they seek to be. 315
U. S., at 147.
The Employer's reliance on Bakery Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333
U. S. 437 (1948), is similarly misplaced. In that case, the Court held only
that a controversy between two businessmen over delivery times or methods of payment does not become a labor dispute merely because a union
representative, with or without his employer's consent, sought to obtain
payment pursuant to a particular method. Id., at 443-444.
14
The Employer's economic-motive analysis also leads to the untenable
result that strikes in protest of unreasonably unsafe conditions and some
sympathy strikes are not "labor disputes."
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ing of § 13, the Court found it immaterial that the picketers,
who were neither union organizers nor store employees,
were not asserting economic interests commonly associated
with labor unions-e. g., terms and conditions of employment
in the narrower sense of wages, hours, unionization or betterment of working conditions. I d., at 560. Although the
lower courts found Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable because
the picketing was motivated by the group's "political" or "social" goals of improving the position of Negroes generally,
and not by the desire to improve specific conditions of employment, this Court reasoned: "The Act does not concern itself with the background or the motives of the dispute." 303
U. S., at 561.
B

The Employer's argument that the Union's motivation for
engaging in a work stoppage determines whether the NorrisLaGuardia Act applies is also contrary to the leg!slali_ve history of that Act. The Act wasenacted in response to federal
court mtervention on behalf of employers through the use of
injunctive powers against unions and other associations of
employees. This intervention had caused the federal judiciary to fall into disrepute among large segments of this Nation's population. See generally S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 8, 1&-18 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4915 (1932) (remarks
of Sen. Wagner).
Apart from the procedural unfairness of many labor injunctions, one of the greatest evils associated with them was the
use of tort-law doctrines, which often made the lawfulness of
a strike depend upon judicial views of social and economic
policy. See, e. g., Cox, Current Problems in the Law of
Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 247, 256
(1958). In debating the Act, its supporters repeatedly expressed disapproval of this Court's interpretations of the
Clayton Act's labor exemption-interpretations which permitted a federal judge to find the Act inapplicable based on

?
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his or her appraisal of the "legitimacy" of the union's objectives.15 See, e. g., 75 Cong. Rec. 4916 (1932) (remarks of
Sen. Wagner) (definition of labor dispute expanded to overrule Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443
(1921) (holding a strike and picketing with the purpose of /
unionizing a plant not a labor dispute because the objectives
were not legitimate and there was no employer-employee
relationship between the disputants)); id., at 5487-5488 (remarks of Sen. Geller) (bill brought forth to remedy decisions
allowing injunction in Duplex and in Bedford Cut Stone Co.
v. Stone Cutters Association, 274 U. S. 37 (1927) (holding /
that decision by workers not to work on nonunion goods not a
labor dispute)). See also id., at 4686 (remarks of Sen. Hebert) (committee minority agreed that injunctions should not
have issued in Bedford and Duplex). See generally H.R.
Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 1{}-11 (1932). The legislative history is replete with criticisms of the ability of powerful employers to use federal judges as "strike-breaking''
agencies; by virtue of their almost unbridled "equitable discretion," federal judges could enter injunctions based on their
disapproval of the employees' objectives, or on the theory
that these objectives or actions, although lawful if pursued by
a single employee, became unlawful when pursued through
the "conspiracy" of concerted activity. See, e. g., 75 Cong.
Rec. 4928-4938 (1932); id., at 546~5468; id., at 5478-5481;
id., at 5487-5490.
Furthermore, the question whether the Norris-LaGuardia
Act would apply to politically motivated strikes was brought
to the attention of the 72nd Congress when it passed the Act.
Opponents criticized the definition of "labor dispute" in
§ 13(c) on the ground that it would cover politically motivated
strikes. Representative Beck argued that federal courts
'" See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 468-469
(1921). See also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Association, 274
u. s. 37, 54-55 (1927).
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should have jurisdiction to enjoin political strikes like those
threatened by labor unions in Europe. 75 Cong. Rec.
5471-5473 (1932) (discussing threatened strike by British
unions protesting the cancellation of leases held by Communist Party members, and threatened strikes by Belgian
unions protesting a decision to supply military aid to Poland).16 In response, Representative Oliver argued that the
federal courts should not have the power to enjoin such
strikes. !d., at 5480-5481. Finally, Representative Beck
offered an amendment to the Act that would have permitted
federal courts to enjoin strikes called for ulterior purposes,
including political motives. This amendment was defeated
soundly. See id., at 5507.
Further support for our conclusion that Congress believed
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to work stoppages instituted for political reasons can be found in the legislative
history of the 1947 amendments to the NLRA. That history
reveals that Congress rejected a proposal to repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act with respect to one broad category of political strikes. 17 The House bill included definitions of various kinds of labor disputes. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1 Legislative History of the LMRA 158 (1947) (Leg.
His.); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Con., 1st Sess., 18-19, 1 Leg.
16
The thrust of this objection was that the Act's definition of a labor dispute "takes no account whatever of the motives and purposes with which a
nation-wide strike or boycott can be commenced and prosecuted." 75
Cong. Rec. 5472 (1932) (remarks of Rep. Beck).
17
In relying on this history, we do not argue that congressional rejection
of a broad repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes accommodation of
that Act to the LMRA. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S.
195, 204-210 (1962). In Boys Markets Co. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398
U. S. 235, 249 (1970), this Court put that argument to rest. Rather, we
rely on this legislative history because it demonstrates that Congress believed that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply to controversies concerning
politically motivated work stoppages. Furthermore, in this case, unlike
Boys Markets, we are not asked to accommodate the Norris-LaGuardia
Act to a specific federal act or to the strong policy favoring arbitration.
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His. 292, 309-310. Of relevance here, § 2(13) defined a "sympathy" strike as a strike "called or conducted not by reason of
any dispute between the employer and the employees on
strike or participating in such concerted interference, but
rather by reason of either (A) a dispute involving another employer or other employees of the same employer, or (B) disagreement with some governmental policy." H.R. 3020,
§ 2(13), 1 Leg. His. 168 (emphasis added). Section 12 of the
House bill made this kind of strike "unlawful concerted activity," and "it remove[d] the immunities that the present laws
confer upon persons who engage in them." H. R. Rep. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 1 Leg. His. 314. In particular,
the Norris-LaGuardia Act would not apply to suits brought
by private parties to enjoin such activity, and damages could
be recovered. See id., at 23-24, 43-44, 1 Leg. His. 314-315,
334-335. In explaining these provisions, the House Report
stated that strikes "against a policy of national or local government, which the employer cannot change," should be
made unlawful, and that "[t]he bill makes inapplicable in such
suits the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which heretofore has protected parties to industrial strife from the consequences of
their lawlessness." !d., at 24, 44, 1 Leg. His. 315, 335.
The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version,
which had eliminated these provisions of the House bill. 18
The Conference Report explained that its recommendation
did not go as far as the House bill, that § 8(b) prohibits juris8
' The Senate had declined to adopt these provisions of the House bill.
The Senate Report explained that it did not want to impair labor's social
gains under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA of 1935, but instead
wanted to remedy "specific types of injustice" or "clear inequities" by "precise and carefully drawn legislation." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 1 Leg. His. 407. Some of the concerted activities listed in § 12 of
the House bill were made unfair labor practices, and the National Labor
Relations Board, not private parties, could petition a district court for injunctions against certain unfair labor practices. See i d., at 35, 40, 1 Leg.
His. 441, 446 (reciting proposed revisions to NLRA, §§ 8(b), lO(k), 10(1)).
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dictional strikes and illegal secondary boycotts, and that the
Board, not private parties, may petition a district court
under § lO(k) or § 10(1) to enjoin these activities notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. H. R. Conf.
Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 36, 42-43, 57, 58-59, 1
Leg. His. 540, 546-547, 561, 562-563. In short, Congress
declined in 1947 to adopt a broad "political motivation" exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act for strikes in protest of
some governmental policy. Instead, if a strike of this nature
takes the form of a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8(b),
Congress chose to give the Board, not private parties, the
power to petition a federal district court for an injunction.
See 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1).

c
This case, brought by the Employer to enforce its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union, involves a "labor
dispute" within any common-sense meaning of that term.
Were we to ignore this plain interpretation and hold that the
political motivation underlying the work stoppage removes
this controversy from the prohibitions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, we would embroil federal judges in the very
scrutiny of "legitimate objectives" that Congress intended to
prevent when it passed that Act. The applicability not only
of § 4, but of all of the procedural protections embodied in
that Act, would turn on a single federal judge's perception of
the motivation underlying the concerted activity. 19 The Em9
' This proposed exception does not limit the judge's discretion to consideration of specified external conduct or of provisions in a collective-bargaining agreement, as does the Boys Markets exception. It provides no
guidance to judges in dealing with concerted activity arguably designed to
achieve both political and labor-related goals. Such mixed-motivation
cases are bound to arise. For example, in United States Steel Corp. v.
United Mine Workers, 519 F. 2d 1236 (CA5 1975), miners picketed another
employer for importing coal from South Africa. The Court of Appeals
held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied, and that the Boys Markets ex-
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ployer's interpretation is simply inconsistent with the need,
expressed by Congress when it enacted the NorrisLaGuardia Act, for clear "mileposts for judges to follow." 75
Cong. Rec. 4935 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bratton).
In essence, the Employer asks us to disregard the legislative history of the Act and to distort the definition of a labor
dispute in order to reach what it believes to be an "equitable"
result. The Employer's real complaint, however, is not with
the Union's political objections to the conduct of the Soviet
Union, but with what the Employer views as the Union's
breach of contract. The Employer's frustration with this alleged breach of contract should not be remedied by characterizing it as other than a labor dispute. We will not adopt
by judicial fiat an interpretation that Congress specifically rejected when it enacted the 1947 amendments to the NLRA.
See generally note 17, supra. In the past, we have consistently declined to constrict Norris-LaGuardia's broad prohibitions except in narrowly defined situations where accommodation of that Act to specific congressional policy is
necessary. We refuse to deviate from that path today.
IV
Alternatively, the Employer argues that the Union's work
stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), and
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397
(1976), because the dispute underlying the work stoppage is
arbitrabletilliler the collective-bargaining agreement. iii
ception was not available, because "the miners' action was not aimed at
[their employer] at all, but rather at the national policy of this country's
permitting the importation of South African coal." 519 F. 2d, at 1247
(footnote omitted). Under the political-motivation exception, even if the
miners had picketed because slave labor was employed to mine the imported coal, the Norris-LaGuardia Act might not apply. Minor variations
in the facts would endow the courts with, or divest them of, jurisdiction to
issue an injunction, and would create difficult line-drawing problems.

f
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making this argument, the Employer disavows its earlier argument that the underlying dispute is purely political, and
asserts that the Union's work stoppage was motivated by a
disagreement with the Employer over the manag_em~nt
ri hts clause in the collective-bargaining agreement. The
Solicitor eneral, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the
United States, agrees with the Employer that the work stoppage may be en· oined endin arbitration. He contends that
in addition to the political dispute, isputes concerning both
the management-rights clause and the work-conditions clause
underlie the work stoppage, and that at least one of these disputes is arguably arbitrable. 20
We disagree. Buffalo Forge makes it clear that a Boys )
Markets injuncti9n pendin~,arbitration should not issue unless the dispute 'underlying the work sto a e 1s ar6itr'able.
The ra wna e o u a o orge compels the cone us1on that
the Union~s work stoppage, called to protest the invasion of
Mghanistan by the Soviet Union,~ot be enjoined penping the arbitrator's decision on whether the work sto page
vio ates
e no-s n e clau..§.e in the co ectlve-bargaining
agreement-:--Tile underlying dispute, whether viewed as an
20

-

-

The management-rights clause provides:
"The Management of the Employer's business and the direction of the
work force in the operation of the business are exclusively vested in the
Employer as functions of Management. Except as specifically provided in
the Agreement, all of the rights, powers, and authority Employer had
prior to signing of this Agreement are retained by the Employer."
The work-conditions clause provides:
"Where hardship is claimed by the Union because of unreasonable or
burdensome conditions or where work methods or operations materially
change in the future, the problem shall first be discussed between the local
and Management involved. In the event an agrement cannot be reached,
either party may refer the dispute to the Joint Negotiating Committee
and, if the matter cannot be resolved by that Committee, either party may
then refer the question to an arbitrator in accordance with the procedure
set fort,h in Clause 15(B)."
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expression of the Union's "moral outrage" at Soviet military
policy or as an expression of sympathy for the people of Mghanistan, is plainly not arbitrable under the collective-bargaining agreement.
The attempts by the Solicitor General and the Employer to
characterize the underlying dispute as arbitrable do not withstand analysis. The~nderlying'' di~utes concerning the
management-rights clause or the work-conditions clause simply did not trigger the work sto page. To the contrary, the
applica Ility o these clauses to the dispute, if any, was triggered by the work stoppage itself. Consideration of
whether the strike intruded on the management-rights clause
or was permitted by the work-conditions clause may inform
the arbitrator's ultimate decision on whether the strike violates the no-strike clause. Indeed, the question whether
striking over a nonarbitrable issue violates other provisions
of the collective-bargaining agreement may itself be an arbitrable dispute. The fact remains, however, that the....strike
itself was not over an arbitrable dispute and t herefore may
not be enjoined pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality
of the strike under the collective-bargaining agreement.
The weaknesses in the analysis of the Employer and the
Solicitor General can perhaps best be demonstrated by applying it to a pure sympathy strike, which clearly cannot be enjoined pending' arbitration under the rationale of Buffalo
Forge. If this work stoppage were a pure sympathy strike,
it could be characterized alternatively as a dispute over the
Employer's right to choose to do business with the employer
embroiled in a dispute With a sister union, as a dispute over
management's right to assign and direct work, or as a dispute
over whether requiring the union to handle goods of the employer whose employees are on strike is an unreasonable
work condition. 21 None of these characterizations, however,
21
In fact, the employer in Buffalo Forge made just such a claim. In
addition to alleging breach of the no-strike clause, it claimed that the strike

(

l

1
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alters the fact, essential to the rationale of Buffalo Forge,
that the strike was not over an arbitrable issue and therefore
did not directly frustrate the arbitration process.
The Employer's argument that this work stoppage may be
enjoined pending arbitration really reflects a fundamental
disagreement with the rationale of Buffalo Forge, and not a
belief that this rationale permits an injunction in this case.
The Employer apparently disagrees with the Buffalo Forge
Court's conclusion that, in agreeing to broad arbitration and
no-strike clauses, the parties do not bargain for injunctive relief to restore the status quo pending the arbitrator's decision
on the legality of the strike under the collective-bargaining
agreement, without regard to what triggered the strike. Instead, they bargain only for specific enforcement of the
union's promise to arbitrate the underlying grievance before
resorting to a strike. See 428 U. S., at 410-412. The Em- 1
ployer also apparently believes that Buffalo Forge frustrates
the arbitration process and encourages industrial strife. But
see id., at 412. 22 However, this disagreement with Buffalo
was caused by "refusal to follow a supervisor's instructions to cross the ...
picket line." Buffalo Forge, supra, at 401. The district court found that
the strike was in sympathy with the sister union and was not over a dispute
that the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. Id., at 402-403.
On appeal, the employer did not press its argument that the work stoppage
was in part a protest over truck driving assignments. Id., at 403, n. 8.
22
The Employer argues that industrial strife is encouraged because employers are given the incentive to discharge or discipline the workers for
refusing to work, which is likely to precipitate further strikes. According
to this argument, the strike, which began over a nonarbitrable dispute, is
transformed into a dispute over an arbitrable issue, i. e. the employer's
right under the collective-bargaining agreement to discipline these workers, and may be enjoined under the Boys Markets/Buffalo Forge exception. See, e. g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F. 2d 1110,
1113-1114 (CA6 1980), affd on other grounds 451 U. S. 401 (1981). This
Court has not addressed the validity of this "transformation" analysis.
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U. S., at 405, n. 4.
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Forge ol!!i'~gues for ~onsidering that decision. 23 It does
not justify~e rationale--onnarcase beyond recognition in order to reach the result urged by the Employer.

v
In conclusion, we hold that an employer's § 301 action to
enforce the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement
allegedly violated by a union's work stoppage involves a
"labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, without regard to the motivation underlying the union's
decision not to provide labor. Under our decisions in Boys
Markets and Buffalo Forge, when the underlying dispute is
not arbitrable, the employer may not obtain injunctive relief
pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality of the strike
under the collective-bargaining agreement. Accordingly, {
the decision of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

23

The Employer has also requested that we reconsider our decision in
Buffalo Forge Co . v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976). We decline this invitation.
______,

l

dfl 06/03/82

J
f'J~
,1-.

Draft:

Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA:

No. 80-1045

Justice Powell, dissenting.

The no-strike clause agreed to by the parties in
this case could scarcely be more emphatic:
term of this Agreement,

"Our ing the

.•• the Union agrees there shall

not be any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever,
for any cause whatsoever." This clause is one of the most
significant provisions

in

the

bargaining

agreement.

It

2.

would seem beyond rational doubt that the dispute in this
case is as much "over"
no-strike

clause

Afghanistan.

In

as

the scope and enforcement of the
it

light of

is
the

"over"
strong

Soviet
federal

policy
policy

in
in

support of arbitration recognized in Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union,

398

u.s.

235

(1970), an injunction

pending arbitration shoul~d:_=
b~e~a~v~a~i~l~a~b~l:e~·------------------------------Court

of this nature
into the "underlying" dispute over Soviet policy and the
"other" dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause.

I

~~~..,-z.~~~~
consider this method of analysis to be •K-ter±y artificial.
it appears that the Court agrees:
"[T]he Employer did not seek to enjoin the
intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan,
nor did it ask the District Court to decide
whether the Union was justified in expressing
disapproval of the Soviet Union's actions.
Instead, the Employer sought to enjoin the
Union's dec is ion not
to provide
labor,
a
decision which the Employer believed violated
the
terms
of
the
collective-bargaining
agreement. It is this contract dispute, and not
the political dispute, that the arbitrator will
resolve, and on which the courts are asked to
rule." Ante, at 8.

"'

7

l

3.

I

If

the

uncomfortable

Court

understandable.

analysis in Buffalo Forge,
one hand, the Court must
case as a

requires

t e dispute within the scope of
But on the other hand, Buffalo

the Court

~~1-krthe

On the

aracterize the dispute in this

the Norris-LaGuardia Act.

t~

the

labor dispute-- nvolving the scope of the no-

strike clause--to bring

Forge

with

dispute

is

t~

a's

-tt3!o+

•==·lac /- and

~p.ge.

~j. a.titJs

.

"really"

argue
r

Soviet ~

over

I(

therefore that the rule of Boy's Market, and the fede{al
policy in support of arbitration, are inapplicable.
The Court

~4U>-~eann~t have it both ways.

~-1
the

Court-1 adheres

So long as

A

to

the

aberrant

analysis

in

Buffalo

Forge, I agree with the Chief Justice that the dispute in
this case must be viewed as a political dispute outside
the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
his dissenting opinion.

I therefore join

JACKS SALLY-POW

lfp/ss 06/03/82

80-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The no-strike clause agreed to by the parties in
this case could scarcely be more emphatic:

"During the

term of this Agreement, ••• the Union agrees there shall
not be any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever,
for any cause whatsoever."

(emphasis added}.

Such a

LA,.)

clause

~b e~ one

of the most significant elements of the

bargaining agreement.

On can fairly assume that the

employer gave considerable ground in other areas of the
~~atning

agreement to gain this apparent guarantee that

all disagreements would go first to arbitration.

~
2hder

.1\

the plain language of the agreement of the parties, the
strike by the respondent should have been enjoined.

JB

ut in labor law - ~ least since this Court's

deJSsion in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428

u.s.

397 (1978} - plain language agreed to by a union does

not bind it.

~.

Buffalo Forge is an f ________________

A

d--

Buffalo Forge cannot be reconciled with labor law policy
to encourage industrial peace through arbitration.

It

2.

severely undercuts Boy's Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, 398

u.s.

235 (1970).

In a word, Buffalo Forge

should be overruled.
The internal contradictions in today's decision
by the Court further illustrate absence of principle in
Buffalo Forge's reasoning.

-~:J{y,e~

RECEIVED
SUPREME COURT. U.S.
PUBLICATION S UNIT

LGJI

-z,- -so1-z,.

·a2 JUN -4 A11 :41

0

dfl 66/03/22

Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA:

No. 80-1045

Justice Powell, dissenting.

The no-strike clause agreed to by the parties in
this case could scarcely be more emphatic:
term of this Agreement,

"During the

.•• the Union agrees there shall

not be any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever,
for any cause whatsoever."

(emphasis added).

•••

Ante, at 3.

Such a clause is one of the most significant provisions in
the bargaining agreement.

One can fairly assume that the

2.

employer gave consider able ground
agreement

to

gain

this

apparent

in other areas of the
guarantee

disagreements would go first to arbitration.

that

all

Thus, under

the plain language of the agreement of the parties,

the

strike by the respondent should have been enjoined pending
arbitration.
But in labor law--since this Court's decision in
Buffalo Forge Co.
(197~lain

it.

Buffalo

v.

United Steelworkers,

428

u.s.

397

language agreed to by a union does not bind
Forge

is

an

aberration.

It

cannot

be

reconciled with labor law policy to encourage industrial
peace

through

arbitration.

It

severely

Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398

undercuts

u.s.

Boys

235 (1970).

In a word Buffalo Forge should be overruled.
The internal contradictions in today's decision
by the Court

further

illustrate absence of principle in

Buffalo Forge's reasoning.

The Court argues that now we

must divide the dispute in this case into the "underlying"
dispute over Soviet policy and the "other" dispute over
the scope of the no-strike clause.

I consider this method

of analysis artificial and unprincipled.

On the one hand,

3.

the Court must characterize the dispute in this case as a
labor

dispute--involving

clause--to

bring

Norris-LaGuardia

the
Act.

the

scope

dispute

within

But

on

of

the

no-strike

the

scope

of

the

the other

hand,

Buffalo

Forge requires the Court to contradict itself by insisting
that the dispute is "really" over Soviet aggression and
therefore that the rule of Boy's Market, and the federal
policy in support of arbitration, are inapplicable.
The Court should not have it both ways.

So long

as it adheres to the aberrant analysis in Buffalo Forge, I
agree with the Chief Justice that the dispute in this case
must be viewed as a political dispute outside the scope of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
opinion.

I therefore join his dissenting

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell

dJUN 7 1982
.
CITCU1ate :- - - - - - - -Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ __ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

80-1045

JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS, INC. ET AL., PETITIONERS v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The no-strike clause agreed to by the parties in this case
could scarcely be more emphatic: "During the term of this
Agreement, ... the Union agrees there shall not be any
strike of any kind or degree whatsoever; . . . for any cause
whatsoever." (emphasis added). Ante, at 3. Such a clause
is one of the most significant provisions in the bargaining
agreement. One can fairly assume that the employer gave
considerable ground in other areas of the agreement to gain
this apparent guarantee that all disagreements would go first
to arbitration. Thus, under the plain language of the agreement of the parties, the strike by the respondent should.have
been enjoined pending arbitration.
But in labor law-since this Court's decision in Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976)-plain language agreed to by a union does not bind it. Buffalo
Forge is an aberration. It cannot be reconciled with labor
law policy to encourage industrial peace through arbitration.
It severely undercuts Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). In a word Buffalo Forge should
be overruled.
The internal contradictions in today's decision by the Court
further illustrate absence of principle in Buffalo Forge's rea-

.

-""---'..

80-1045--DISSENT
2

JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS v. LONGSHOREMEN

soning. The Court argues that now we must divide the dispute in this case into the "underlying'' dispute over Soviet
policy and the "other" dispute over the scope of the no-strike
clause. I consider this method of analysis artificial and unprincipled. On the one hand, the Court must characterize
the dispute in this case as a labor dispute-involving the
scope of the no-strike clause-to bring the dispute within the
scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But on the other hand,
Buffalo Forge requires the Court to contradict itself by insisting that the dispute is "really" over Soviet aggression and
therefore that the rule of Boy's Market, and the federal policy in support of arbitration, are inapplicable.
The Court should not have it both ways. So long as it adheres to the aberrant analysis in Buffalo Forge, I agree with
the CHIEF JusTICE that the dispute in this case must be
viewed as a political dispute outside the scope of the NorrisLaGuardia·Act. I therefore join his dissenting opinion.
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.

I
This case in no sense involves or gTows out of a labor dispute as that term is defined in § 13( c) of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 113(c) (1976) . See ante, at 7 n.
9. Section 13(c) defines a labor dispute as "any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment. . .. " 1 The
dispute in this case is a political dispute and has no relation to
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment. If Congress had intended to bar federal courts from
issuing injunctions in political disputes, it could have simply
prohibited federal courts from enjoining strikes rather than
limiting its prohibition to controversies concerning terms or
conditions of employment. Accordingly, I disagTee with the
Court's conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act bars a federal court from enjoining this politically motivated work
stoppage.
The International Longshoremen's Association objects to
the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. As a conse'Section 13(c) also includes union organizational activity within its definition of labor dispute, but this case clearly does not in\'olve such activity.
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quence, it announced that it would not handle any cargo
.bound to, or coming from, the Soviet Union, or any cargo carried on Soviet ships. This case commenced after the union,
pursuant to its political position, refused to load
superphosphoric acid onto certain ships bound for the Soviet
Union. The union has no objection to any terms or conclitions of employment; it would have loaded the
superphosphoric acid on any non-Soviet ship bound for a destination other than the Soviet Union. No one has suggested
that the ILA's action is actually motivated to obtain concessions concerning employment conditions. The union refused
to handle the cargo simply because a foreign country invaded
a neighboring country and the union desired to express its
opposition to the invasion. Thus the plain meaning of§ 13(c)
leads to the conclusion that this case does not involve or grow
out of a labor dispute because the union members are not
seeking to change their terms or conditions of employment.
As the Court recognizes, we have held that the test of
whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies is whether "the
employer-employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy." Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton,
315 U. S. 143, 147 (1947); quoted ante, at 10. Federal courts
of appeals have stated that unions are protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act when they act to advance the economic interests of their members. See, e. g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail1'oad Company,
362 F. 2d 649, 654 (CA5 1966). These cases illustrate the
plain meaning of § 13(c)'s definition of labor dispute-the
Norris- LaGuardia Act protects union organizational efforts
and efforts to improve working conditions.
The Court errs gTavely in finding that the matrix of this
controversy is the union's relationship with the petitioners.
The ILA's dispute with the petitioners merely flows from its
decision to demonstrate its opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan. No economic interests of union members are involved; indeed, the union's policy is contrary to its members'
economic interests since it reduces the amount of available
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work. 2 Thus, the cases generally explicating the meaning of
§ 13(c) lend no support to the notion that this case involves a
labor dispute.
The federal courts have consistently recognized that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply to politically motivated
work stoppages concerning subjects over which employers
have no control. These courts, in cases which are for all
practical purposes indistinguishable from this case-and
which often involved the International Longshoremen's Association-properly concluded that the Act only applies to
economic disputes.l This Court has never before held, as it
holds here, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act protects strikes
resulting from political disputes rather than from labor disputes. Since the meaning of the words of the statute is
plain, and since the applicable precedent supports the conclusion that this is not a labor dispute, we ought to conclude that
politically motivated strikes are outside the coverage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.'
'The Court's reliance on New Negl'O Alliance v. Sanitwy Groce1y Co.,
303 U. S. 552 (1938), is misplaced. Ante, at 11-12. The picketers in that
case might not have been seeking to better their own personal economic
position, but their purpose was to affect the terms and conditions of employment of the picketed store, since their object was to persuade the store
to employ negroes. Section 13(c) explicitly states that the coverage of the
Act does not depend on whether "the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee." Ante, at 7 n. 9.
' See Kheclivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers lnteJ'JWtional Union, 278 F.
2d49, 50-51 (CA2 1960) (politically motivated blacklist of Egyptian ships to
retaliate for Egyptian blacklist of American ships that dealt with Israel is
not "labor dispute" triggering Norris-LaGuardia): West Gulf iliaritime
Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 372 (SD Tex.
1975, affd summarily, 531 F. 2d 574 CCA5 1976) (union's refusal, on political grounds, in violation of a no-strike agreement, to load grain on a ship
bound for the Soviet Union does not present a "labor dispute").
'The excerpts from the legislative history relied upon by the Court fall
short of the clear evidence required to overcome the plain language of
~ 13(c). See, e. g., Breacl Political Action Committee v. Federal Election
Commission,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982). In 1947, Congress declined to
amend the federal labor laws so that strikes protesting "disagreement with
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Finally, the Court argues that a common-sense interpretation of the meaning of the term labor dispute supports its conclusion. But the "common-sense" meaning of a term is not
controlling when CongTess has provided, as it provided in
§ 13(c), an explicit definition of a labor dispute. "Common
sense" and legislative history ought not change the meaning
of the unambig1wus words of a statute. It is not contended
that any act of petitioners to improve the terms or conditions
of employment would have persuaded the union to load the
ships. Hence there is no labor dispute under the NorrisLaGuardia Act.

II
This case, together with our recent decision in International Longshoremen's Association v. Allied Inter·national,
Inc.,-- U. S. - - (1982), illustrates the inherent flaw in
the holding in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428
U. S. 397 (1976). If the Court cannot give to ordinary words
some government policy" would not be protected by the Norris- LaGuardia
Act. I Legislative History of the LlVIRA 168 (1947): ante, at 15. However, the language of the rejected House version of the amendment was
quite broad. There are cases in which unions might disagTee with government policy and properly take collective action protesting it in order to advance the legitimate economic interests of union members if the terms or
conditions of their employment would be affected. Congress might have
rejected the House version because of fear that its broad reach would render legitimate union activity unprotected.
In 1932 Congress rejected an amendment which would have permitted
federal courts to enjoin acts "performed or threatened for an unlawful purpose or with an unlawful intent .... " 75 Cong. Rec. 5507 (1932): ante, at
14. This amendment would have swept more broadly than the plain language of § 13(c) as adopted. Indeed, Representative Beck's amendment
could have rendered the Norris-LaGuardia Act a nullity, since federal
judges in the 1930's would have been able to enjoin a strike merely by finding it motivated by an "unlawful purpose." Thus the legislative history
does not lead to or compel a conclusion in this case contrary to the plain
language of§ 13(c).
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their ordinary meaning and gTasp that the dispute in this case
is a purely political dispute rather than having any relation to
a labor dispute, it should overrule BI~ffalo Forge.
The controversy in Allied International also resulted from
the International Longshoremen's Association's protest over
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There we held that the
union's refusal to unload shipments from the Soviet Union
was a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159(b)(4). The
union is therefore liable for damages as a result of its refusal
to unload the shipments. Yet the Court today holds that the
union may not be enjoined from refusing to load cargo onto
ships bound for the Soviet Union.
This is all the more perplexing because the union entered
into an agTeement with petitioner which contained an unequivocal no-strike clause: "During the term of this Agreement, ... the Union agTees there shall not be any strike of
any kind or degTee whatsoever, ... for any cmise whatsoever." (Emphasis added). Ante, at 3. In Allied International this union was found liable for damages caused to a
party with which it had no such agTeement. Here, however,
despite the existence of the no-strike agTeement between petitioner and the union, the Court holds that the union's illegal
acts may not be enjoined.
To reach this strange result, the Court first decides that
this case involves a labor dispute rather than a political dispute , and therefore is within the scope of the NorrisLaGuardia Act. The Court then contradicts itself and con. eludes that, since the dispute is really a political protest over
Soviet aggression, it may not be enjoined under the Buffalo
Forge exception to the rule of Boys Markets, Inc. v. R etail
Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), since a federal court cannot resolve the actual dispute. This case, together withAllied International, persuades me that the artificial Buffalo
Forge exception should be abolished. Rather than continuing to engage in mechanical and contradictory analyses as to
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the character of disputes such as this one, we should hold that
a federal court may enjoin a strike pending arbitration when
the striking union has agreed to a contract with a no-strike
clause such as the one agTeed to by petitioner and the ILA.
That is what we seemed to hold in Boys Markets, and we
should not have tinkered with that holding in Buffalo Forge.
There is no rational way to reconcile this holding with Allied International. If we must overrule Buffalo Forge to
come to a consistent result, we should do so.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens

Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.
Based on the legislative history of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., and our previous cases interpreting it, e. g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,
303 U. S. 552 (1938), the ,ourt correctly concludes that this
case involves a labor dispute within the meaning of § 4 of the
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104. The Court also correctly determines
that under Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428
U. S. 397 (1976), no injunction may issue pending arbitration
because the underlying political dispute is not arbitrable
under the collective bargaining agreement. Unless the
Court is willing to overrule Buffalo Forge, the conclusion
reached by the Court in this case is inescapable. Therefore,
I concur in the judgment.
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80-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. tLA
I have now read the Chief's revised dissent in
which he has anded a new Part II.
As you say, he largely plagiarizes my little
opinion.

I am still inclined, however, to stay with it.

you have a different view?
In Justice Marshall's recently circulated draft,
he cites Allled (on a "cf." basis, as I recall).
this suggests no comment by me.

T..J.F.P., Jr.
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